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It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property
Rights in Personal Information
Vera Bergelson
Abstract
”It’s Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information”
discusses the disturbing erosion of privacy suffered by the American society in
recent years due to citizens’ loss of control over their personal information. This
information, collected and traded by commercial enterprises, receives almost no
protection under current law. I argue that, in order to protect privacy, individuals
need to secure control over their information by becoming its legal owners. In
this article, I confront two fundamental questions that have not been specifically
addressed in the privacy literature before: why property is the most appropriate
regime for regulating rights in personal information, and why individuals have a
stronger moral claim to personal information than its collectors. Recognizing that
individual rights may not be absolute, I further propose a way to balance them
with rights of collectors and public at large, explore a range of legal and prac-
tical implications the new rules may create, and make suggestions regarding the
enforcement of information privacy rights.
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INTRODUCTION 
When in 1993 The New Yorker published its now famous cartoon1 
showing a dog surfing the web and telling another dog, “On the Internet, 
nobody knows you’re a dog,” we laughed because the “information 
superhighway” seemed a place where everyone was totally anonymous.  
Today, looking at that same cartoon, we find amusing the proposition 
itself and laugh, if at all, at our own past naiveté. 
The computer revolution has dramatically affected our privacy by 
making it possible to record, store, and process every scrap of personal 
information we leave behind.2  In the course of our everyday activities,3 
we routinely reveal our names, addresses, and social security numbers as 
well as our financial decisions, health problems, tastes, habits, political 
and religious affiliations, sexual orientation, hobbies, and love affairs.4 
For decades, companies have collected such information and used it 
internally for marketing or research and development.5  The growth of 
computer technology in the 1990s allowed them to distribute the data far 
and wide6 and promoted the development of a new phenomenon  a 
 
 1 Peter Steiner, Cartoon, “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog,” NEW YORKER, 
July 5, 1993, at 61. 
 2 I am using the terms “personal information” and “personal data” interchangeably 
and in the meaning assigned to the term “personal data” in the European Union Data 
Protection Directive (i.e., “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person” where an identifiable person is “one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, 
in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to 
his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”).  See Council 
Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data 
Protection Directive]; see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-17, 
at 966 (1978) (defining “personal information” as any information which identifies or 
relates to specific individual). 
 3 Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy:  A Fortress or Frontier for 
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 205 (1992) (“It is probably not commonly known 
that credit card companies develop lifestyle profiles of card holders, that 
telecommunications companies track users’ calling patterns, that product manufacturers 
track the habits of individual customers, and that credit reporting agencies also assemble 
data on household composition (such as marital status of occupants) and on legal disputes 
involving individuals.”). 
 4 See Adam L. Penenberg, The End of Privacy, FORBES, Nov. 29, 1999, at 1 (describing 
experiment pursuant to which Penenberg hired web detective and asked him to find as 
much information as possible about Penenberg using only phone and computer).  The 
results of the experiment were rather shocking.  It took the detective only a few days to 
uncover “the innermost details of my life  whom I call late at night; how much money I 
have in the bank; my salary and rent.”  Id.  The detective also uncovered Penenberg’s 
unlisted phone numbers and a record of monthly payments to his psychotherapist.  Id. 
 5 This Article also refers to such companies as “primary collectors.” 
 6 See Penenberg, supra note 4, at 1. 
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secondary market7 in which personal information itself became a 
valuable commodity.8  Today, billions of dollars are made annually from 
the sale of mailing lists alone,9 and the direct-marketing industry 
continues to grow.10 
The expansion of the market for personal information resulted in the 
unprecedented erosion of individual privacy.  The value of a personal 
information database depends to a large degree on how precisely it 
captures a segment of a community with well-defined purchasing 
susceptibilities.  For that reason, lists brokers began to focus on more and 
more private and sensitive characteristics of people’s lives.11 Such 
specialized lists may include names of men who called various phone-
sex numbers; gay and lesbian magazine subscribers; women who 
requested free samples of adult diapers; or men who sought medical 
help for impotency.12 
 
 7 This Article refers to companies that obtain personal information in the secondary 
market as “secondary collectors.”  In addition, this Article sometimes refers to both 
primary collectors and secondary collectors as “collectors” generally. 
 8 See, e.g., Native Forest Network, Native Forest Network’s Guide to Stop Junk Mail, at 
http://www.nativeforest.org/stop_junk_mail/nfn_junk_mail_guide.html [hereinafter 
Native Forest Guide] (estimating that value of each name is typically worth 3 to 20 cents each 
time it is sold); see also Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. 
Privacy Rights:  Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 779 (2001) (noting that, 
in many cases, e-commerce company’s most valuable asset is its customer database). 
 9 See William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal 
Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 956 (1996) (stating that “[t]he annual market for 
mailing lists alone, without factoring in sales attributable to their use, has been estimated at 
approximately $3 billion.”). 
 10 The direct-marketing industry employs more than eighteen million people and is 
growing at a rate estimated at twice that of the United States’ gross national product.  See 
ARTHUR M. HUGHES, THE COMPLETE DATABASE MARKETER 5 (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing 
expansion of database marketing and direct marketing); Fenrich, supra note 9, at 956; Scott 
Foster, Online Profiling Is on the Rise:  How Long Until the United States and the European 
Union Lose Patience With Self-Regulation?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 260 (2000) 
(discussing online profiling and impact of self-regulation); see also U.S. News & World 
Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518, at *1 (Va. Cir. June 13, 1996) 
(noting that, in 1995, direct marketing accounted for approximately one trillion dollars of 
revenues generated for goods and services). 
 11 See Judith Waldrop, The Business of Privacy, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1994, at 46, 49 
(noting that people who meet sensitive and personal criteria have particularly good chance 
of being on list); see also Mary Zahn & Eldon Knoche, Electronic Footprints:  Yours Are a Lot 
Easier to Track Than You May Think, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 1995, at 1A (“Any 
lesbian or a diabetic has a good chance of being on a list.  A Jew has an excellent chance of 
making some marketing list.”). 
 12 See Zahn & Knoche, supra note 11, at 1A; see also Fenrich, supra note 9, at 953 n.17 
(discussing lists that are routinely sold by list brokers, including names of following 
people:  more than 300,000 men who called various phone fantasy numbers; 55,912 gay and 
lesbian magazine subscribers; 5,000 women who responded to 800 phone number offering 
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Over the years, various privacy groups and members of the general 
public have voiced concerns that people in this country have lost all 
control over their personal information.13  Scholars from diverse 
backgrounds have supported these concerns, pointing out that existing 
laws are insufficient to protect privacy and fall far behind the 
developmental trajectory of information technology.14  Under the current 
law, individuals neither own their personal information, nor have a 
recognized privacy interest in it.15  Thus, on the one hand, they are 
powerless to prevent its unauthorized dissemination, and on the other, 
they are excluded from its profitable commercial exchange.  In other 
words, individuals have all the downside and practically no upside of 
the commodification of personal information. 
This Article takes the position that, in order to protect privacy, 
individuals must secure control over their personal information by 
becoming its real owners.  Similar views have already been expressed in 
a number of legal and non-legal publications concerning information 
privacy.16  While making an important contribution to the privacy 
debate, the vast majority of those publications have focused primarily on 
the social utility of granting individuals property rights in personal 
information.  This Article adopts a somewhat different approach. 
The first half of this Article reviews the current treatment of personal 
information by industries (Part I) and law (Part II), and briefly addresses 
the constitutionality of expanding individual rights in personal 
 
information and samples of adult diapers (this list sold for $270); and 82,000 men 55 and 
older who sought help for impotency at medical clinics). 
 13 See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy; Privacy Regulation in National Networks, 
COMM. OF THE ACM, Sept. 1996 at 92, 94 (reporting that, according to Equifax poll, 76% of 
U.S. citizens believe they have lost all control over personal information); see also 
Penenberg, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing how, due to development of computer technology 
“America, the country that made ‘right to privacy’ a credo, has lost its privacy to the 
computer”). 
 14 See Penenberg, supra note 4, at 1 (reporting that scholars specializing in history, 
sociology, business, and political science have all concluded that current privacy laws are 
insufficient and outdated); see also A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1461, 1462 (2000) (arguing that unprecedented variety of technologies collect personal 
information in ever-increasing variety of contexts). 
 15 See discussion infra Part II. 
 16 See, e.g., Laudon, supra note 13, at 92; Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63-65 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of 
Perpetual Sunlight:  Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 
26-41 (1996); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information:  An Economic 
Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in 
Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2003). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
BERGELSON_MACRO_-_NOVEMBER_21 11/22/2003  10:53 AM 
384 University of California, Davis [Vol. 37:379 
information (Part III).  Against this background, I confront two related 
normative questions that have not yet been specifically addressed in the 
privacy literature:  why the property regime is the most appropriate 
regime for regulating rights in personal information (Part IV); and why 
individuals have a stronger moral claim to personal information than 
collectors (Part V).  In my view, exploring these two questions is 
essential for building a foundation for a comprehensive theory of 
information privacy. 
In the second half of this Article, I seek to translate my normative 
arguments into legal rules and propose a way to balance the rights of 
individuals, collectors, and the public at large (Part VI); explore a range 
of legal and practical implications that the new rules may create (Part 
VII); and conclude with some suggestions regarding the enforcement of 
individual rights in personal information (Part VIII).  My research 
focuses only on the relationship between individuals and commercial 
enterprises, not the government,17 and only on the kind of identifiable 
personal information that individuals provide or make visible 
incidentally to entering into a transaction or utilizing services of these or 
other enterprises. 
I.  REALITY CHECK:  WHAT HAPPENS TO OUR PERSONAL INFORMATION? 
“I bought the Social Security numbers of John Ashcroft, CIA Director 
George Tenet and Karl Rove for $26 each on the Internet,” relates Jamie 
Court.18  “Their home addresses and telephone numbers cost a little 
more.  For $295, another Internet service says it will sell me bank account 
balances.”19 
The development of computer technology and of the Internet raised 
the collection, processing, and further use of personal information to a 
new level.20  It is now both technologically possible and economically 
 
 17 In most instances, principles and solutions suggested in this paper apply to public 
entities as well.  A Department of Motor Vehicles, for example, should have no more right 
to sell personal information supplied by its customers than does a drugstore.  However, 
certain governmental agencies, dealing for instance with law enforcement, may have 
additional rights and limitations.  Those rights and limitations are outside the scope of this 
Article. 
 18 MarketPlace:  Interview with Jamie Court (Minn. Pub. Radio broadcast, July 16, 
2003).  Jamie Court is a consumer activist and co-author (with Michael Moore) of 
CORPORATEERING:  HOW CORPORATE POWER STEALS YOUR PERSONAL FREEDOM. . . AND 
WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2003). 
 19 MarketPlace:  Interview with Jamie Court (Minn. Pub. Radio broadcast, July 16, 
2003). 
 20 See Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 146 CONG. REC. S7656-68 (daily 
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viable to capture and store for long periods of time information about 
minute, transient aspects of peoples’ lives  information that before the 
computer revolution was simply lost or immobilized on “remote 
mainframes that were difficult to access, even for the techies who put it 
there.”21  Today, computers hold half a billion bank accounts, half a 
billion credit card accounts, hundreds of millions of mortgages, 
retirement funds, and medical claims,22 as well as information about 
consumers’ purchases, travel, hobbies, sexual orientation, and religious 
and political affiliations.23 
This data comes from a variety of sources:  online and offline purchase 
records, supermarket savings cards, white pages, surveys, sweepstakes 
and contest entries, financial and property records, U.S. Census data, 
motor vehicle registration information, credit card transactions, phone 
records, product warranty cards, the sale of magazine and catalog 
subscriptions, and public records.24  In addition, Internet retailers (“e-
tailers”) use more subtle methods of data collection such as offering 
customers free Internet access and free e-mail.25  Another widespread 
 
ed. July 26, 2000) (statement of Sen. McCain).  Senator McCain argued: 
The ability of the internet to aid business in the collection, storage, transfer, and 
analysis of information about a consumer’s habits is unprecedented.  While this 
technology can allow business to better target goods and services, it also has 
increased consumer fears about the collection and use of personally identifiable 
information. 
Id.; see also Mary Culnan, Online Privacy Alliance, Privacy and the Top 100 Sites:  A           
Report to  the Federal Trade Commission, available at http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/ 
gippshome.html (June 1999) (finding that 98% of major computer websites collect personal 
information). 
 21 Penenberg, supra note 4, at 1. 
 22 See id. (describing variety of personal information that is available on web and 
predicting that “[a]s e-commerce grows, marketers and busybodies will crack open a cache 
of new consumer data more revealing than ever before.”). 
 23 See Waldrop, supra note 11, at 49 (noting that Standard Rate and Data Service 
mailing-list catalog that is widely used by direct-marketing industry includes lists 
reflecting customers’ “religion, sexual orientation, medical information and political 
contributions”). 
 24 See EPIC Privacy and Consumer Profiling, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ 
(last updated Sept. 25, 2002) (listing sources of personal information available to collectors); 
see also FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE:  A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1999) 
(discussing different direct methods of data collection); Foster, supra note 10, at 259 
(discussing ways to collect personal information from Internet users). 
 25 See Deborah Kong, GM Offers a “Honey” of a Deal on Net Service, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, 
Jan. 14, 2000, at 1C (quoting NetZero’s chairman Mark Goldston, who stated that company 
uses “the free access, the free e-mail, as the honey to attract bees,” and pointed out that 
technology companies use it “like a GPS tracking system.  The minute you come on, it 
knows who you are, it knows where you go.”). 
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form of inconspicuous tracking of personal data is through the use of 
“cookies”26 which allow a web site provider to monitor every page on its 
site that users visit, every online advertisement that they view, and every 
mouse click that they make.27  Major advertisement services, such as 
DoubleClick, Inc., now use cookies to monitor and profile Internet users’ 
activities on any site where the company places its advertisements.28 
The end result of direct and indirect tracking of consumer behavior, 
purchases, and exchanges of information in the secondary market, as 
well as data sharing by affiliates of multi-profile companies,29 is that 
collectors now have data on broad segments of the population.  At its 
recent workshop, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has reported that 
some collectors have data on most of the U.S. population.30  More 
importantly, collectors are in a position to compile various consumer 
data from different sources to form comprehensive profiles of 
 
 26 A cookie is a set of data that a website server gives to a browser the first                
time the user visits the site.  HIGH TECH DICTIONARY, available at http://www.currents.net 
/resources/dictionary/index.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2003).  It is updated with each 
return visit.  The remote server saves the information about the user contained in the 
cookie.  The user’s browser does the same and stores the information as a text file in the 
Netscape or Explorer system folder.  See, e.g., id. 
; see also EPIC Public Opinion on Privacy, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ (last 
updated Sept. 25, 2002) (“Many Internet users cannot identify the most basic tracking tool 
on the Internet:  the cookie.  In an August 2000 study conducted by the Pew Internet and 
American Life Project, 56% of Internet users could not identify a cookie.”); Steve Lohr, 
Internet Companies Set Policies to Help Protect Computer Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at 
C1 (reporting that 56% of Internet users could not explain what a “cookie” is). 
 27 No  Hiding  Place,  ECONOMIST,  Jan. 23,  2003,  available at www.economist.com 
(reporting that almost every website attempts to plant “cookies” on your computer  
“[y]our every move on the internet is being recorded by someone, somewhere.”). 
 28 See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Honing in on Privacy; As Databases Collect Personal Details 
Well beyond Credit-Card Numbers, It’s Time to Guard Yourself, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2000, at H1 
(explaining that cookies provide information about behavior patterns of computer users, 
often without their knowledge). 
 29 See Martin Abrams, Executive Director of the Center for Information Policy and 
Leadership, Hunton & Williams, Federal Trade Commission Public Workshop, The 
Information Marketplace:  Merging and Exchanging Consumer Data (Mar. 13, 2001), quoted in 
Robert Gellman, Privacy, Consumers, and Costs:  How the Lack of Privacy Costs Consumers and 
Why Business Studies of Privacy Costs are Biased and Incomplete, available at 
http://www.epic.org/reports/dmfprivacy.html#2 (Mar. 2002) (“The data comes from 
many, many sources.  As we discussed, some of them are public record sources.  Some of 
them are surveys.  Some of them are purchase data, but the data comes from many sources, 
not a single source.”). 
 30 Id. (“Aggregators have data on a broader population.  Some aggregators have most 
of the U.S. population.”); see Zahn & Knoche, supra note 11, at 1A (reporting that company, 
which deems itself world’s leading broker and manager of Jewish lists, claims it “can 
identify and mail to 85% of the 2.6 million Jewish households in the United States”). 
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individuals, their lifestyles and preferences.31 
In the personal data market, the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts.  For example, a partnership between Kmart and Yahoo! allowed 
the two companies to apply the real-world data that Kmart had collected 
from eighty-five million households to targeted marketing on the 
Internet.32  In addition, the recent merger of DoubleClick, Inc., the largest 
advertising network on the web, with Abacus Direct Corporation, which 
runs America’s largest database of catalog-buying behavior, made it 
 
 31 Profiling companies have well-developed lexicons to classify individuals.  Claritas, 
for instance, divides individuals into fifteen different groups, which are in turn categorized 
into various subgroups.  These include: 
 
• “Elite Suburbs” (Blue Blood Estates, Winner’s Circle, Executive Suites, Pools & 
Patios, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs); 
• “Urban Uptown” (Urban Gold Coast, Money & Brains, Young Literati, American 
Dreams, Bohemian Mix); 
• “2nd City Society” (Second City Elite, Upward Bound, Gray Power); 
• “Landed Gentry” (Country Squires, God’s Country, Big Fish Small Pond, Greenbelt 
Families); 
• “Affluentials” (Young Influentials, New Empty Nests, Boomers & Babies, Suburban 
Sprawl, Blue-Chip Blues); 
• “Inner Suburbs” (Upstarts & Seniors, New Beginnings, Mobility Blues, Gray 
Collars); 
• “Urban Midscale” (Urban Achievers, Big City Blend, Old Yankee Rows, Mid-City 
Mix, Latino America); 
• “2nd City Center” (Middleburg Managers, Boomtown Singles, Starter Families, 
Sunset City Blues, Towns & Gowns); 
• “Exurban Blues” (New Homesteaders, Middle America, Red White and Blues, 
Military Quarters); 
• “Country Families” (Big Sky Families, New Eco-topia, River City USA, Shotguns 
and Pickups); 
• “Urban Cores” (Single City Blues, Hispanic Mix, Inner Cities); 
• “2nd City Blues” (Smalltown Downtown, Hometown Retired, Family Scramble, 
Southside City); 
• “Working Towns” (Golden Ponds, Rural Industria, Norma Rae-ville, Mines and 
Mills); 
• “Heartlanders” (Agri-Business, Grain Belt); and 
• “Rustic Living” (Blue Highways, Rustic Elders, Back Country Folks, Scrub Pine 
Flats, Hard Scrabble). 
 
See EPIC Privacy and Consumer Profiling, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ (last 
updated Sept. 25, 2002). 
 32 See Kalinda Basho, The Licensing of Our Personal Information:  Is It a Solution to Internet 
Privacy, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1507, 1508 n.4 (2000) (quoting Ken Magill, Kmart, Yahoo Deal a 
Databaser’s Dream?, MARKETING NEWS, Dec. 24, 1999, at 1).  Kmart chairman Floyd Hall 
stated that Kmart has the capability to figure out not only what type of toothpaste a 
consumer will buy but also what brand, how much, and what items they will be interested 
in buying in the future.  See id. 
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possible to bring together anonymous clickstream data “from the five 
billion ads DoubleClick serves per week and the two billion personally 
identifiable consumer catalog transactions recorded by Abacus.”33 
At the time of the merger, DoubleClick’s customer database, according 
to the company’s chief privacy officer, included profiles on forty to fifty 
million Internet users.34  Today, DoubleClick reportedly maintains 
cookies on one hundred million Internet users.35  DoubleClick’s 
announcement that it plans to combine its data with that of Abacus has 
outraged privacy-rights advocates.  This has prompted a series of 
lawsuits filed in several state and federal courts around the country,36 
and an FTC investigation of the company’s practice of profiling web 
users without adequate disclosure.37  Although the FTC eventually 
closed its investigation without action, a coalition of ten states pursued 
DoubleClick’s practices and forced the company to accept a binding 
agreement regarding privacy policies and disclosure, and required the 
company to pay a fine of $450,000 to reimburse the states’ investigative 
costs.38 
 
 33 Courtney Macavinta, DoubleClick, Abacus Merge in $1.7 Billion Deal (Nov. 24, 1999), at 
http://www.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1463444.html?tag+st.ne.1002 (pointing out 
potential effects of DoubleClick’s merger on privacy groups and Internet marketing 
industry). 
 34 John T. Acquino, Senate Online Profiling Hearing Suggests Movement Toward Federal 
Legislation, E-COM. L. WKLY. (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.law.com/servlet 
/ContentServer?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/View&c=LawArticle&cid=1015973967
146&live=true&cst=1&pc=0&pa=0 (citing testimony of DoubleClick’s chief privacy officer 
Jules Polonetsky to U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation). 
 35 No Hiding Place, supra note 27, at 8 (discussing immense capacity of DoubleClick’s 
database). 
 36 Courtenay Youngblood, Case Notes and Comments:  A New Millennium Dilemma: 
Cookie Technology, Consumers, and the Future of the Internet, 11 J. ART & ENT. L. 45, 53-54 
(2001) (exploring DoubleClick’s lawsuit, which focused on need for enhanced consumer 
privacy protection on Internet). 
 37 See Acquino, supra note 34 (discussing FTC investigation of DoubleClick and 
testimonies of advertisement companies to U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation concerning use of personal information in online profiling). 
 38 See In the Matter of DoubleClick:  Agreement between the Attorneys General of the States of 
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Vermont, and Washington and DoubleClick (Aug. 26, 2002), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a<uscore>02<uscore>attach.pdf; 
Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Major Online Advertiser Agrees to Privacy Standards 
for Online  Tracking (Aug. 26, 2002),  available  at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002 
/aug/aug26a<uscore>02.html; see also Andrea Petersen, DoubleClick Reverses Course After 
Privacy Outcry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2000, at B1 (reporting that DoubleClick decided to 
suspend its plan of combining databases with Abacus until government and industry 
develop guidelines on what practices are appropriate for collection of personal information 
through Internet). 
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A recent wave of bankruptcy filings and business liquidations by 
numerous dot-coms39 raised another question:  may a bankruptcy trustee 
sell consumer data in an effort to maximize the size of the estate 
available for unsecured creditors even if such sale would violate the 
insolvent company’s privacy policy?40  “That question exploded into the 
collective consciousness when Toysmart.com, an e-tailer of educational 
toys, sought to sell its customer list in bankruptcy despite its promise 
never to share such data.”41 
At the time of its bankruptcy in June, 2000, Toysmart’s customer 
database contained information on approximately 250,000 individuals,42 
including “name, address, billing information, shopping preferences, 
order history, gift registry selections, [and] family profile information 
about consumers’ children, such as name, gender, birthday, and toy 
interests.”43  Toysmart sought to sell the database as part of its 
bankruptcy estate.44  It even ran an ad in the Wall Street Journal that read, 
“We will sell you our data. We will sell you the names and addresses 
and family profiles of everyone who is registered with our site.”45  There 
would have been nothing unusual in such a sale but for Toysmart’s 
explicit promise to its customers never to share their personal 
information with a third party.46 
 
 39 See Luis Salazar, FTC Takes Action, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 9, 2000, at B6 (citing expectations 
for “deluge of Internet bankruptcies” and estimating that as many as 75% of e-tailers will 
fail); see also Victoria Slind-Flor, Privacy or Creditors:  Who Holds the Trump?, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 
4, 2000, at A1 (listing dot-coms going out of business). 
 40 See Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 792 (using Toysmart’s bankruptcy as example 
of recent bankruptcy filings). 
 41 Id. at 780. 
 42 Matt Richtel, Toysmart.com in Settlement with F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2000, at C1, 
C14 (discussing large size of Toysmart’s consumer database). 
 43 In re Toysmart.com, L.L.C., No. 00-13995-CJK, Stipulation and Order Establishing 
Conditions on Sale of Customer Information (D. Mass. July 21, 2000) [hereinafter Stipulation and 
Order], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/toysmartbankruptcy.1.htm (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2003). 
 44 See Toysmart.com’s Plan to Sell Consumer Data is Challenged by FTC, WALL ST. J., July 
11, 2000, at C8, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3035966 (discussing Toysmart.com’s plan to 
violate its privacy agreement with its consumers). 
 45 See Glenn R. Simpson, FTC Is Set to Challenge Toysmart.com to Prevent the Sale of 
Consumer Data, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2000, at A3 (reporting on Toysmart’s attempt to sell its 
customer database); see also Gary M. Schober et al., Colloquium on Privacy & Security, 50 
BUFF. L. REV. 703, 717 (2002) (quoting text of ad but incorrectly attributing it to New York 
Times). 
 46 First Amended Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief ¶ 8, 
F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, L.L.C., Civ. Action No. 00-11341-RGS, (D. Mass. July 21, 2000), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/us/ 2000/07/toysmartcomplaint.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 
2003).  Toysmart provided that: 
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The FTC filed a complaint, arguing that such a sale would constitute a 
deceptive practice prohibited by Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.47  In addition, the attorneys general of a number of 
states intervened in bankruptcy proceedings under their respective 
consumer protection acts.48  Over vigorous objections of thirty-eight 
attorneys general,49 the FTC and Toysmart reached a settlement that 
permitted the company to sell its customer database.50  The case was 
finally resolved when one of Toysmart’s investors agreed to purchase 
and destroy the list.51  The questions the case raised, however, remain far 
from resolution. 
The Toysmart bankruptcy, just like the DoubleClick-Abacus merger, 
attracted significant public attention and once again raised the problem 
of the inadequacy of current privacy laws and the need for 
comprehensive federal legislation protecting personal information.52  
 
Personal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to our site, such as name, 
address, billing information and shopping preferences, is never shared with a 
third party.  All information obtained by Toysmart.com is used only to 
personalize your experience online. . . .  When you register with Toysmart.com, 
you can rest assured that your information will never be shared with a third 
party. 
Id. 
 47 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000) (proscribing unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce). 
 48 See Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 792 (providing details of Toysmart’s 
bankruptcy); see also Toysmart.com’s Plan to Sell Consumer Data is Challenged by FTC, supra 
note 44 (reporting that FTC objected to sale of customer information in light of explicit 
promise to maintain customer privacy); Stephanie Stoughton, States Weigh in on Toysmart 
Privacy Case, 38 Attorneys General Join Opposition to Sale of Data, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 
2000, at C1, available at 2000 WL 3336111 (reporting involvement of attorneys general of 
many states into Toysmart’s bankruptcy litigation). 
 49 See Stoughton, supra note 48, at C1 (pointing out that thirty-eight state attorneys 
general opposed FTC’s settlement with Toysmart.com and permitting sale of its customer 
list). 
 50 See Stipulation and Order, supra note 43 (authorizing sale of customer database as part 
of company’s goodwill but only to “an entity that (1) concentrates its business in the family 
commerce market, involving the areas of education, toys, learning, home and/or 
instruction, including commerce, content, product and services, and (2) expressly agrees to 
be Toysmart’s successor-in-interest as to the Customer Information, and expressly agrees to 
[certain other] obligations.”). 
 51 See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Hot Commodity:  Dot-Com Lists:  Creditors’ Asset of Choice, 
NAT’L POST, Mar. 5, 2001, at E02, available at 2001 WL 14437954 (reporting that Walt Disney 
agreed to pay Toysmart $50,000 to destroy its customer list); see also Toysmart Database to Be 
Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at C7 (reporting that decision to destroy Toysmart’s 
customer list effectively concluded FTC’s suit against Toysmart). 
 52 Diane Anderson, Wisconsin Woman Auctions Personal Info Online, June 16, 2000, 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/06/16/wisconsin.info.for.sale. 
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Before turning to the question of how the law should change, it is 
important to map out the boundaries of existing privacy law. 
II.  CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN LAW WITH RESPECT TO PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 
Currently, American law covering personal information is “a 
patchwork of uneven, inconsistent, and often irrational” federal and 
state rules.53  Most of them protect individuals from dissemination of 
their personal information by governmental entities.54  The few federal 
regulations that apply to the transfer of personal information in the 
private market cover certain areas of banking and financial services,55 
 
idg/index.html (noting that DoubleClick-Abacus merger made number of web surfers 
realize that, as they surf, they leave behind wealth of information). 
 53 FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 80 (1997). 
 54 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) (permitting individual to 
determine which personal records are collected, maintained, or disseminated by federal 
agencies); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2000) (providing procedural 
requirements for sharing financial information among federal agencies); Privacy Protection 
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2000) (protecting work products of individuals against 
searches and seizures by law enforcement officers); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 
18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000) (limiting circumstances under which drivers’ personal information 
may be disclosed); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 20 U.S.C.S. § 1232(h) (Law. 
Co-op. 2002) (prohibiting collection of students’ personal information by Department of 
Education to be disclosed for purposes of marketing or selling); Department of 
Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 2002 § 311(a), 115 Stat. 833 (2001) 
(requiring that “no recipient of funds made available in this Act shall disseminate personal 
information obtained by a State department of motor vehicles in connection with a motor 
vehicle record”); Information Practices Act of 1977, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (Deering 2001) 
(prohibiting “disclosure of personal information, such as employment history information, 
by any state agency except under certain circumstances, including situation where 
disclosure of information is relevant and necessary.”); CAL. VEH. CODE § 1808.45 (Deering 
2001) (stating that right to privacy protects personal information given by individuals to 
Department of Motor Vehicles); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3-23(d.1)(1) (2002) (“Personal 
information of any registrant, including name, address, date of birth, or driver’s license or 
social security number, shall not be furnished or transferred by or to any person”); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 66A, § 2(c) (2002) (forbidding “any other agency or individual not 
employed by the holder [from having] access to personal data” unless it is for purposes of 
medical treatment, application to professional licenses, special investigation bureau, or for 
detection of fraud and control); MO. REV. STAT. § 32.091(2) (2001) (prohibiting Department 
of Revenue from disclosing personal information collected “without expressed consent 
given by the person to whom such information pertains”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-3-101(8) 
(2002) (prohibiting Montana Department of Motor Vehicles from furnishing personal 
information for public inspection); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (codified 
as amended at 2001 S.C. S.B. 1087 (2002)) (amending South Carolina law to prohibit 
dissemination of veterans’ discharge records for commercial uses). 
 55 See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (2000) [hereinafter 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act] (recognizing individual’s right to privacy with regard to 
disclosure of personal credit records); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1976, 12 U.S.C.A. § 
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entertainment, cable and telecommunications,56 education,57 and postal 
services.58  Adopted in response to specific violations or concerns relating 
to a particular industry, these regulations are not based on any uniform 
theory of rights and differ significantly in the scope of protection offered 
to individuals.  Scholars and privacy advocates have criticized most of 
these regulations as inadequate, largely attributing their weakness to the 
lobbying efforts of the interested industries.59  In addition to the federal 
laws, many states have enacted industry-specific legislation.60  Like their 
federal counterparts, state laws generally seek to resolve a specific set of 
problems within a given industry and fail to provide coherent and 
 
3401 (2002) (recognizing individual’s right to privacy with regard to disclosure of financial 
records by banks to governmental agencies); Financial Modernization Services Act, 15 
U.S.C.S. §§ 6701, 6801, 6901 (2003) (requiring that financial institutions allow customers to 
“opt out,” i.e., object to disclosure of their personal information). 
 56 See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C.S. § 6501 (2003) 
(prohibiting Internet service providers from collecting personal information from children 
under the age of thirteen); Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.S. § 251 (2003) 
(offering limited protection to customers’ proprietary information); Video Privacy 
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2701 (2003) (recognizing privacy of video rental customer as to 
specific movies bought or rented); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C.S. 
§ 227 (2003) (protecting individuals’ privacy against unwanted phone solicitation); Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C.S. § 521 (2003) (recognizing cable television’s 
subscriber’s privacy as to viewing habits); Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, 
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000) (protecting individuals against interception and disclosure of wire, 
oral, or electronic communications). 
 57 See, e.g., Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232(g) 
(2002) (recognizing students’ privacy rights with respect to access and disclosure of student 
records). 
 58 See, e.g., 39 C.F.R. § 268.2 (2003) (stating that any postal employee who violates 
Private Information Act and disburses individual’s personal information shall be fined at 
minimum of $1,000). 
 59 See Fenrich, supra note 9, at 966-67 (discussing that lobbying efforts of Direct 
Marketing Association with respect to Video Privacy Protection Act resulted in weaker 
privacy protection:  the bill, as adopted, disallows only unauthorized disclosure of specific 
titles of movies rented by customer; other personal information, including video 
preferences categorized by subject matter, may be transferred without customers’ consent 
as long as they had opportunity to opt out); see also MarketPlace:  Interview with Jamie 
Court, supra note 18 (“Corporations have so freely traded in the individual’s private 
information that almost everyone’s privacy is at risk, so much so that nine out of ten people 
think that corporations should obtain consent before selling an individual’s private 
information, but year after year, this simple proposition has been defeated in statehouse 
after statehouse by America’s biggest banks and insurers.”). 
 60 See  PRIVACY  LAWS  BY  STATE,  available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer 
/states.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2003) (providing detailed information about privacy-
related topics covered by each state law); see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 6:5-6:127 (2d ed. 2000) (reviewing state statutes protecting 
various forms of privacy). 
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systematic protection of personal information.61 
Practically all federal and state laws that address the issue of 
individual consent to collection and use of personal information apply 
the “opt-out” rule, which requires companies to give individuals an 
opportunity to opt-out of the company’s standard practices.62  Very few 
laws are based on the more protective “opt-in” model, which obligates 
companies to obtain express customer consent before they can share or 
sell customer information.63 
The choice of the privacy-protection regime is critical because of 
consumers’ tendency to stay with the default option.64  Moreover, 
 
 61 See Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 222-23 (criticizing state industry-specific regulations 
for their limited and ad hoc nature, including failure to address systematic protection of 
privacy concerns relating to acquisition, storage, transmission, use, and disclosure of 
personal information). 
 62 See, e.g., Angela R. Karras, The Constitutionality of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act:  
A Fork in the Information Access Road, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 125, 133 (1999) (providing list of 
following states that gave drivers or vehicle owners opt-out option to choose level of 
confidentiality for personal information open to public:  Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, 
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
 63 Laws requiring “opt-in” consent include the Cable Communications Policy Act of 
1984 and the Video Privacy Protection Act.  See discussion supra note 56; see also Ann 
Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves:  Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 633, 665 
(2000) (noting opt-in provisions of Video Privacy Protection Act); Schober et al., Colloquium 
on Privacy & Security, supra note 45, at 729 (commenting that “in the United States you, in 
fact, have more right to privacy in your video rental records than you do in the amount of 
money you have in your financial accounts.  You have more privacy in the fact that you 
rent Bambi than your medical records.”). 
  An important recent development is a rule adopted by the FCC designed to protect 
sensitive personal information of customers of telecommunications carriers.  The FCC 
Order provides for express customer approval for carriers’ release of customer information 
to third parties, but permits opt-out consent for release of information to affiliated parties.  
See Third Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,               
July 16, 2002, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-214A1.pdf.  
Following the FCC Order, Washington State adopted “the nation’s strongest rules 
protecting telephone customer privacy.”  See Washington Regulators Adopt Nation’s    
Strongest Telephone Customer-Privacy Rules, at http://www.wutc.wa.gov/webdocs.nsf/6f0 
baa33f074e151882566c20000604d/93d4130392518ad988256c6a0060f5a5 (Nov. 7, 2002).  The 
Washington rules mandate express approval for all “call detail” information, and permit 
information sharing only within companies under common ownership.  Id. 
 64 See Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 116 (2001).  If a 
merchant chooses an “opt-out” regime in which the permission box is pre-checked and 
consumers need to uncheck it to withhold permission, a large majority of consumers will 
leave it checked.  If the site chooses an “opt-in” regime, in which the permission box is 
unchecked and consumers need to check it to give permission, a large majority of 
consumers will leave it unchecked. 
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companies have little incentive to facilitate the opt-out process.  Privacy 
advocates often describe opt-out notices as “deceptive” and buried in 
“legalese.”65  Since the laws do not provide any guidelines or standards 
for the opt-out mechanics, “each process is likely to include unique 
hurdles, requiring consumers to muddle through a different opt-out 
process for each firm.”66  Opt-out procedures are often cumbersome.  For 
example, many companies require their customers to first request an opt-
out form, wait for its arrival by mail, and then mail it back.67 
As for the common law treatment of personal information, there have 
been only a few decisions, which were rather fact-specific and based on a 
mix of legal theories.  In all of those, the courts refused to recognize the 
plaintiffs’ claims since they did not fit under the existing categories of 
protected interests.  Some courts have also pointed out that the 
appropriate remedy would be creation of a statutory right.68 
The existing piecemeal approach brings into focus the need for 
comprehensive, (not industry-specific) legislation regulating the 
respective rights of individuals and commercial enterprises that collect 
personal information.69  This need has become even more urgent now 
due to the development of privacy laws in the international arena.  In 
 
 65 Eric Roston, How to Opt Out of Database Sharing:  Who’s Got your Number?, TIME, July 
2, 2001, at 46. 
 66 Jolina C. Cuaresma, Business Law:  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 497, 513 (2002) (criticizing personal data protection provisions of Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act). 
 67 See Kathy Kristof, Choice Words for Opting Out; Consumers Run into Trouble With 
Privacy Forms, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2001, at 7N (describing opt-out procedures); see also 
Robert MacMillan, Few Net Banks Offer Clear Privacy Protections, NEWSBYTES, Aug. 29, 2001, 
LEXIS, General News & Information, NYSBYT (stating that Center for Democracy and 
Technology has reported that less than one-third of banks offer online opt-out option and 
some firms require customers to first call to request opt-out form that would be sent via 
U.S. mail).  Some 86% of Internet users favor an “opt-in” privacy policy and say that 
Internet companies should ask people for permission to use their personal information.  See 
Trust and Privacy Online:  Why Americans Want to Rewrite the Rules, available at  
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/reports.asp?Report=19&Section=ReportLevel2& 
Field=Level2ID&ID=37 (Aug. 20, 2000). 
 68 See Shibley v. Time, 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting subscriber’s 
claim for unauthorized sale of subscriber lists in absence of specific right recognized by 
common law and pointing out that “this is the case peculiarly within the province of a 
legislative branch”). 
 69 Acquino, supra note 34 (quoting Sen. John McCain, Chairman of U.S. Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, saying that “[a]bsent legislation, 
meaningful enforcement, and airtight coverage, online profiling will eviscerate personal 
privacy.”); see also Reidenberg, supra note 16, at 898 (observing that “[a]t present, without 
clear statutory rights, there is an important lack of legal accountability or liability for the 
unfair treatment of personal information by the private sector.”). 
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October 1998, the European Union’s Directive on Data Protection took 
effect.70  It permits transfers of personal information only to those 
countries outside the European Union (“EU”) that provide an 
“adequate” level of privacy protection.71  Unsurprisingly, the United 
States was not viewed as such a country.72 
The ban on transfers of personal information to the United States 
jeopardized not only cross-border transactions between American and 
EU companies, but also everyday operations of multinational 
corporations with offices on both sides of the Atlantic.  Negotiations 
between the United States and the EU lasted for two years and resulted 
in an agreement known as “Safe Harbor Privacy Principles,” which 
became effective in October 2000.73  The agreement allows American 
companies to receive data from their EU counterparties, provided that 
they either adhere to a set of privacy-protection principles embodied in 
the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and publicly declare that they do so, 
or develop another self-regulatory privacy-protection program that is in 
accord with the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.74 
 
 70 See Press Release, European Union, EU Directive on Personal Data Protection Enters 
Into Effect, at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1998-4/pr89-98.htm (Oct. 23, 1998). 
 71 Id. 
 72 See Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/99 concerning the level of data 
protection in the United States and the ongoing discussions between the European 
Commission and the United States Government 2 (Jan. 26, 1999), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/index_en.htm (opining that “the 
current patchwork of narrowly-focused sectoral laws and voluntary self-regulation cannot 
at present be relied upon to provide adequate protection in all cases for personal data 
transferred from the European Union.”). 
 73 Issuance of Principles and Transmission to European Commission: Procedures and 
Start Date for Safe Harbor List, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,534 (Sept. 19, 2000); see U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, Commission Decision Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Adequacy of Protection Provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and 
Related Frequently Asked Questions, Annex I, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_ 
market/en/dataprot/news/shprinciples.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2003). 
 74 The Safe Harbor Principles require companies to give notice to individuals before 
any identifiable personal information is transferred to a third party.  Individuals should 
have an opportunity to object to any transfers of their personal information.  If this 
information is of a particularly sensitive nature (specifying medical or health conditions, 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union 
membership, or the sex life of the individual), an affirmative consent of the individual is 
required.  Third parties acting as agents must assure at least the same level of privacy 
protection as the transferring company itself.  In addition, companies must protect personal 
information from misuse and process it only for the purposes for which it has been 
collected or authorized by the individual.  Finally, the individual should have access to his 
personal information and the right to correct or delete inaccurate information.  See U.S.  
Dep’t  of  Commerce,  Safe Harbor Overview, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_ 
sh_documents.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (establishing guidelines for U.S. companies 
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The Safe Harbor Privacy Principles are an important step in 
establishing a data protection regime in this country.  At the same time, 
they are just an emergency measure designed to deal with the ultimatum 
issued by the EU to the United States  either to satisfy the EU privacy 
requirements or face grave economic consequences.  As a permanent 
solution, the “Safe Harbor” approach is much more problematic.  It 
requires U.S. companies to establish an internal legal regime that is at 
odds with the current national law and market practice.75  The exact costs 
of establishing such a regime are unclear but the strong objections to 
international privacy standards from parts of the business community 
suggest that they are high.76 
In addition, the “Safe Harbor” approach creates an incentive for U.S. 
participants to maintain two privacy standards  the higher one for 
European consumers and the lower one for domestic consumers.77  
Moreover, domestic consumers are likely to carry, at least partially, the 
costs involved in satisfying the higher “Safe Harbor” requirements from 
which they themselves will not be able to benefit.  All these monetary 
and moral costs could have been avoided had the United States itself 
enacted adequate data privacy-protection laws.78 
III.  CAN AMERICAN LAW PROTECT PERSONAL INFORMATION PRIVACY 
WITHOUT VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION? 
Most scholars agree that individuals’ loss of control over personal 
information may lead to undesirable societal consequences.79  What they 
disagree on is how to balance two conflicting societal interests  in 
privacy and in the free flow of information.80  The main principled 
objection to expanding data privacy laws comes from defenders of free 
speech who argue that granting individuals control over personal 
 
that process personally identifying information relating to EU citizens). 
 75 Gellman, supra note 29 (pointing out that costs incurred by Safe Harbor participants 
would have been avoided had United States enacted laws that meet international privacy 
standards). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. (explaining that Safe Harbor solution creates “the possibility of maintaining 
different privacy regimes for different customers as well as the unattractive possibility of 
having lower privacy standards for American customers”). 
 78 Id. (arguing that “U.S. privacy laws could have avoided some costs for American 
multinational companies while providing improved privacy protections for Americans”). 
 79 But see DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1998) (expressing view that privacy 
is no longer option because government and corporations will always have privacy-
invasive technologies and arguing in favor of “transparent” society). 
 80 See discussion infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text. 
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information would be unconstitutional.81 
These authors maintain that any transfer of information is speech.  
Thus, “the right to information privacy  my right to control your 
communication of personally identifiable information about me  is a 
right to have the government stop you from speaking about me.”82  This 
argument raises a fundamental question:  even assuming there is a need 
to protect personal information, can American law afford to do so 
without violating the Constitution?  In confronting this issue, it is 
important to keep in mind that we are talking not about any speech 
(newspaper publications, gossip, political debate) but only about 
identifiable personal data supplied by an individual incidentally to a 
business transaction. 
The freedom of speech guaranteed to American citizens by the First 
Amendment is one of the main characteristics of a democratic society.  
Yet “from obscenity to intellectual property, from defamation to insider 
trading, from the Fair Credit Reporting Act to the FDA’s mandatory 
labeling requirements,” there are many different regulations that restrict 
speech and information.83  One may add to this list the obligation of 
confidentiality that the law imposes on lawyers, doctors, and certain 
other professionals. 
There may be several ways to justify restrictions on transfers of 
personal data in light of the requirements of the First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  The most developed argument is that such transfers 
amount only to “commercial speech” and thus, should enjoy limited 
constitutional protection.  A number of advocates on both sides of the 
debate have classified the collection and exchange of personally 
identifiable information as commercial speech.84  The few courts that 
have addressed the issue tend to agree with this classification.85  In U.S. 
 
 81 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:  The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1122 
(2000) [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy] (arguing that 
“restrictions on speech that reveals personal information are constitutional under current 
doctrine only if they are imposed by contract, express or implied”); see also Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 223 
(1996) (criticizing argument that Constitution’s free speech guarantee must sometimes 
yield to other constitutionally-protected values). 
 82 Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, supra note 81, at 1050-51. 
 83 Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment:  A Skeptical Approach, 11 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 132 (2000). 
 84 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1373, 1409-10 (2000) (discussing theories of commercial speech and justifications for 
data privacy protection). 
 85 See U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1999); United Reporting 
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West v. FCC, the Tenth Circuit stated:  “[W]hen the sole purpose of. . . 
speech. . . is to facilitate the marketing of telecommunications services to 
individual customers, we find the speech integral to and inseparable 
from the ultimate commercial solicitation.  Therefore, the speech is 
properly categorized as commercial speech.”86  Practically all transfers of 
personal data to the secondary market are done for the purpose of 
facilitating future marketing of services to the customers who are the 
subjects of that personal data.  Thus, there is a strong argument in favor 
of viewing these communications as commercial speech. 
Regulation of commercial speech must satisfy the constitutional test 
articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission of New York.87  Under that test, if the law targets a 
communication that is not misleading or related to an unlawful activity, 
the regulation, in order to pass constitutional muster, must:  (i) be 
supported by a substantial governmental interest, (ii) materially advance 
that interest, and (iii) be no more restrictive than necessary to serve that 
interest.88  A similar standard applies to content-neutral laws that burden 
speech only indirectly.89  In other instances, the governmental interest 
must be compelling and the regulation must be narrowly tailored to 
promote that interest in the least restrictive way.90 
A democratic society does have a strong interest in protecting privacy 
in personal information.91  If people know that they are being watched 
 
Publ’g Corp. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom. 
Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
 86 See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1233. 
 87 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 88 See id. at 564. 
 89 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that incidental 
limitations of freedom of speech are permissible if essential to furtherance of substantial 
governmental interest unrelated to suppression of speech). 
 90 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality opinion); Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983). 
 91 See Laudon, supra note 13, at 92 (observing that protection of privacy is widely 
accepted value in democratic societies “without which the concept of democracy based on 
individual choice makes little sense”).  That was also Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s concern 
when he wrote more than three decades ago: 
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record, each 
containing a number of questions. . . .  There are thus hundreds of little threads 
radiating from every man, millions of threads in all.  If these threads were 
suddenly to become visible, the whole sky would look like a spider’s web, and if 
they materialized as rubber bands, buses, trams and even people would lose the 
ability to move, and the wind would be unable to carry torn-up newspapers or 
autumn leaves along the streets of the city. 
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and their activities are recorded forever, they tend to conform their 
behavior to the requirements of the observing authority, and that 
conformism may seriously imperil the diversity and freedom of society.92  
Therefore, the government has at least a substantial interest in protecting 
individual privacy, and a regulation that materially advances this 
interest, without being more restrictive than necessary, would satisfy 
constitutional requirements for a restriction on commercial speech. 
Some scholars have argued that the state’s interest in protecting the 
privacy of its citizens is not merely substantial but compelling because 
the right to privacy is an important constitutional right,93 and protection 
of a constitutional right is a compelling interest.94  If that argument 
 
ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD 192 (1969). 
 92 See, e.g., PAUL M. SCWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW:  A STUDY OF 
UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 39-42 (1996) (arguing that free society depends on 
individual self-determination, autonomy, and dignity which may be guaranteed only if 
individuals have control over personal information); see also Edward Bloustein, Privacy as 
an Aspect of Human Dignity:  An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964) 
(“The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and whose every 
need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived 
of his individuality and human dignity.”); Thomas Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 
WASH. L. REV. 777, 779-81 (1980) (arguing that unauthorized disclosure of personal 
information subjects individuals to fear of “presumptuous evaluation” and restricts their 
liberty). 
 93 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1609, 1651 (1999) (arguing that information privacy speech restrictions are needed to 
promote democratic self-rule).  But see Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, 
supra note 81, at 1106-10 (criticizing attempts to restrict free speech).  Courts have not been 
in accord as to whether there is a constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal 
information.  Compare Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 
F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that Supreme Court has addressed issue in recurring 
dicta without resolving it, but recognizing that several circuit courts have concluded that 
there is constitutional right to privacy in nondisclosure of personal information) with Doe 
v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no general right to 
nondisclosure of private information). 
 94 See Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, supra note 81, at 1106-10 
(discussing “constitutional tension” argument).  In addition, arguments have been made 
that the government has a compelling interest in protecting people’s dignity, emotional 
tranquility, and safety.  See, e.g., Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76, 76 
(1978) (arguing that without privacy, “intimate relationships simply could not exist”); 
Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39 (1976) 
(arguing that privacy is “an essential part of the complex social practice by means of which 
the social group recognizes  and communicates to the individual  that his existence is 
his own.  And this is a precondition of personhood.”); Matthew Childs, Computer Cops 
Versus the First Amendment, PLAYBOY, May 1992, at 46 (quoting Lawrence Tribe’s proposal 
made at Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference to add new Amendment to United 
States Constitution, reading: 
This Constitution’s protections for the freedoms of speech, press, petition and 
assembly, and its protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the 
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succeeds, a data privacy regulation may be able to withstand even higher 
scrutiny than that applicable to non-commercial speech.95  Even if it does 
not, a regulation that gives control over transfers of personal information 
to the individual while recognizing both society’s legitimate interests in 
hearing about matters of public concern, as well as the legitimate 
interests of commercial enterprises in collecting, analyzing, and using 
this information, should not be in conflict with First Amendment 
requirements.  As the forthcoming discussion shows, this is exactly the 
kind of regulation advocated in this Article.96 
IV.  WHAT LEGAL THEORY SHOULD REGULATE RIGHTS IN PERSONAL 
INFORMATION? 
One of the most serious obstacles to a successful legislative action is 
“the absence of a coherent understanding of the nature of information 
privacy interests.”97  What legal theory should underlie such legislation 
and in what context should courts review competing claims?  As 
Raymond T. Nimmer has correctly pointed out: 
In the United States, privacy is a subject of rhetoric and ideas, not 
consistent or forceful legal analysis.  The idea that privacy rights 
exist is an accepted political and judicial principle.  Most agree that 
protecting personal privacy in the Information Age is a fundamental 
challenge in this era.  Yet the idea of privacy provides limited 
guidance in the information age.98 
Privacy is a notoriously amorphous concept that has been said to 
include a variety of rights held by an individual against both state and 
private actors  from the right to be free from certain kinds of intrusion 
to the right to make certain personal decisions.99  The right of 
 
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, shall be 
construed as fully applicable without regard to the technological method or 
medium through which information content is generated, stored, altered, 
transmitted or controlled.). 
 95 See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140-42 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (per curiam) (finding that corporation’s target marketing lists comprised speech of 
purely private, personal information and denied application of strict scrutiny to those lists 
because Fair Credit Reporting Act advanced public’s concern for privacy over 
corporation’s speech interest). 
 96 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 97 Jonathan P. Graham, Privacy, Computers and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal 
Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1424 (1987). 
 98 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ¶ 16.02, at 16-4 (2001). 
 99 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1092-126 
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information privacy is a subcategory of privacy in general, and, like the 
“parent” concept, it reflects the uneasy coexistence of two major 
competing paradigms:  “privacy as secrecy” and “privacy as control.” 
Historically, privacy has been viewed as a personal right, structured 
around the secrecy paradigm.  This understanding takes origin in the 
famous definition authored by Judge Thomas M. Cooley100 and made 
known by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren,101 who described privacy 
as the “right to be let alone.”102  Under this view,103 the information kept 
private (that is, secret) by an individual is entitled to legal protection 
from intrusion by others.104  In recent years, however, it has become 
apparent that the secrecy model is unable to address information privacy 
concerns arising out of the realities of a modern economy in which 
individuals “routinely and daily place information concerning 
themselves into the hands of others, thereby in effect disclosing that 
information.  Being ‘let alone’ in that setting is less relevant than being in 
control of the distribution and use by others of knowledge regarding our 
life.”105 
 
(2002) (discussing various conceptions of privacy).  Solove finds six recurrent themes in the 
privacy discourse: 
(1) the right to be let alone  Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s famous 
formulation for the right to privacy; (2) limited access to the self  the ability to 
shield oneself from unwanted access by others; (3) secrecy  the concealment of 
certain matters from others; (4) control over personal information  the ability to 
exercise control over information about oneself; (5) personhood  the protection 
of one’s personality, individuality, and dignity; and (6) intimacy  control over, 
or limited access to, one’s intimate relationships or aspects of life. 
Id. 
 100 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1888) (declaring that person has “the 
right to be let alone”). 
 101 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193 (1890) (discussing various notions of privacy and privacy rights). 
 102 Id. 
 103 See NIMMER, supra note 98, ¶ 16.02[1], at 16-5 (“The idea of a right to be let alone 
suggests a legal right to be free from intrusion by others into the sphere of protected or 
secret information concerning the person.”); see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: 
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1431 (2001) 
(“It was out of this paradigm that the Big Brother metaphor emerged.  Under the paradigm, 
privacy is about concealment, and it is invaded by watching and by public disclosure of 
confidential information.”). 
 104 This theory has traditionally helped define the boundaries of an individual’s claim 
to privacy in the area of constitutional law.  See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967) (holding that no Fourth Amendment protection exists for information knowingly 
exposed to public, but that Fourth Amendment protects information that individual seeks 
to preserve in private). 
 105 NIMMER, supra note 98, ¶ 16.02[1], at 16-5 (“The idea of a right to be let alone 
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Conversely, the privacy-as-control model has gained significant 
academic support in recent years.106  This model treats information 
privacy as a form of power, the “claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.”107  The control 
paradigm implements the liberal autonomy principle by seeking to place 
the individual at the center of decision-making about personal 
information use.108  In many respects, it is a property paradigm:  it 
presumes that an individual has a qualified right to exclude others from 
accessing his personal information as well as a similarly qualified right 
to determine the terms on which this information may become available 
to others. 
The control paradigm has been criticized by some scholars109 for 
underestimating the socio-political value of privacy and the role of the 
government in shaping and enforcing this value.110  Placing reliance 
entirely on individual control and industry self-regulation, without 
further legislative or enforcement action, may, in fact, lead to further 
erosion of privacy.  The control model, however, does not necessitate 
that.  It is quite possible to combine that model with governmental 
supervision.  Moreover, it is possible to allocate control so that 
competing interests and values of different societal groups are taken into 
account.  Individuals’ control in that case would not be absolute, just like 
the privacy interest is never absolute in a society; nevertheless, 
implementing the control model would provide a realistic and fair 
mechanism for the protection of that interest. 
The two paradigms  “privacy as secrecy” and “privacy as control” 
 are reflected in attempts to define individual rights with respect to 
personal information through either torts or property.  From the 
perspective of torts, an individual’s right to personal information is an 
 
suggests a legal right to be free from intrusion by others into the sphere of protected or 
secret information concerning the person.”). 
 106 Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000) 
(observing that the “leading paradigm on the Internet and in the real, or off-line world, 
conceives of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one’s data”). 
 107 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
 108 See Schwartz, supra note 106, at 820. 
 109 Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data Control:  Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the 
Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 865 (2000) (pointing out that “[w]hile some of the theorists 
who reject the control-emphatic definition have done so as part of an effort to supplant 
liberalism, even liberals have rejected control-based definitions of privacy”). 
 110 See id. at 868 (arguing that control over personal data is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to protect privacy); Schwartz, supra note 106, at 818-34 (criticizing “bottom-up” 
privacy-control model). 
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extension of traditionally understood privacy, a personal right that may 
not be unreasonably infringed upon.  The role of the court in such a case 
is to determine what kind of infringement amounts to a violation of the 
individual’s privacy.  From the property perspective, personal 
information is not a personal right but rather a good, and the court’s job 
is to determine who has a prior claim to that good and how to regulate 
any coexisting and competing claims. 
A.  Current Treatment of Personal Information Under the Property and Tort 
Regimes 
1.  Current Treatment of Personal Information Under the Property 
Regime 
Currently, neither property nor torts theory recognizes individuals’ 
rights in their information.  At the heart of that nonrecognition is a view 
that personal information is no ones until collected, a view similar to the 
“wild animals’ theory” set forth in Pierson v. Post.111  In that famous early 
American case, the court concluded that wild animals in the state of 
nature are not owned by anyone until captured, and that whoever 
captures the animal first has the prior claim to it.  Today, courts view 
personal information in a similar fashion.  Even though they often 
acknowledge that personal information has become a valuable 
commodity, they believe that it belongs to no one until collected.  
Accordingly, it can only be the property of a collector.112 
This belief stands behind the decision in Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California113 in which the court denied the plaintiff property 
rights in his body and his biological information.  This belief is even 
more explicit in a few cases114 in which plaintiffs made unsuccessful 
attempts to block unauthorized dissemination of personal information 
based on the theory of misappropriation of an individual’s name.115  The 
courts rejected these claims, stating, inter alia, that individuals do not 
 
 111 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 112 Theoretically, individuals can compile and sell their personal data.  See Wisconsin 
Woman Auctions Personal Info Online, supra note 52 (reporting story of Tracy Coyle, who 
prepared detailed docket of data about herself and announced that she would auction it to 
highest bidder).  So far, however, this example appears to be unique. 
 113 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990). 
 114 See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); U.S. News & 
World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518, at *1 (Va. Cir. June 
13, 1996); Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
 115 See discussion infra notes 159-81 and accompanying text. 
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have property rights in the names they use.116 
Both federal117 and most states’118 laws punish identity theft.  But 
despite the name of the offense, what these laws really aim at is future 
crime (e.g., theft, fraud) the commission of which is facilitated by 
identity theft.119  Unless there is intent to commit that future crime, an 
unlawful use or transfer of identifying information does not constitute a 
theft of identity. 
And yet, courts have consistently recognized the property rights of 
business enterprises in their customer lists under both state and federal 
laws, including laws on secured transactions, bankruptcy, and 
taxation.120  Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code covers security 
interests in personal property,121 and various state courts have held that 
customer lists are general intangibles, a subset of personal property.122  
Similarly, the Internal Revenue Code considers customer lists to be 
intangible property.123  Bankruptcy cases view customer lists as part of 
the debtor’s estate, which is itself comprised of property.124 
 
 116 Avrahami, No. 95-1318, slip op. at *16. 
 117 See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (“Identity Theft Act”), 918 U.S.C. 
1028, amended by Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998). 
 118 See http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/federallaws.html#statelaws (providing list 
of states that have passed laws related to identity theft) (last revised Sept. 30, 2003). 
 119 See, e.g., Identity Theft Act, supra note 117, ¶ 003 (making it illegal for someone to 
“knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another 
person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a 
violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local 
law”); cf. American Law Institute Model Penal Code Official Draft § 232(2) (1962) (“A 
person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully transfers immovable property of another or any 
interest therein with purpose to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto.”). 
 120 Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 788 (noting that various sets of laws, including 
laws on secured transactions and bankruptcy, have reinforced “property-like” nature of 
customer lists). 
 121 See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (2000) (revised) (“This article applies to:  (1) a transaction. . . 
that creates a security interest in personal property”). 
 122 See, e.g., In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
valid grant of security interest in general intangibles covered company’s customer lists); see 
also John C. Minahan, Jr. & Bryan G. Handlos, Scope of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 390 PLI/PAT 205, 212 (1986) (“Property such as customer lists. . . have been held to be 
general intangibles, obtaining an interest in which is subject to Article 9.”); Dan L. 
Nicewander, General Intangibles Under Revised Article 9, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 169, 
170 (2000) (comparing former and revised versions of Article 9 and concluding that, despite 
more narrow scope of definition of “general intangibles” in revised Article 9, customer lists 
remain within its scope). 
 123 See Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 789 n.6 (noting that § 936(h)(3)(B)(v) of 
Internal Revenue Code defines “intangible property” to include customer lists). 
 124 See, e.g., In re El Paso Refinery, L.P., 196 B.R. 58, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) (citing 
foreclosure order naming customer lists among general intangibles); In re Collated Prods. 
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2.  Current Treatment of Personal Information Under the Tort Regime 
In the torts area, American courts recognize several privacy-related 
causes of action.  Pursuant to the authoritative classification of Dean 
Prosser,125 they are usually unified into four groups  false light,126 
intrusion upon seclusion,127 public disclosure of embarrassing facts,128 
and the appropriation of name or likeness.129  Out of those, the last three 
could provide a basis for recovery for an unauthorized acquisition or 
transfer of personal information.130  All three theories, however, have 
been tested and rejected by courts in that context. 
 
 
Corp., 121 B.R. 195, 197 (Bankr. D. Del. 1990) (including customer lists in general intangible 
assets owned by corporation), aff’d, Collated Prods. Corp. v. United Jersey Bank Cent., 
N.A., 937 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 790 
(concluding that customer lists are “almost certain ‘property’ within the meaning of the 
Bankruptcy Code”). 
 125 See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (exploring theory 
of privacy and four privacy torts). 
 126 Id. at 398.  The false light tort protects the individual’s right to be secure from 
publicity that places a person in a “false light before the public.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 652E (1977). 
 127 The intrusion tort protects the individual against intentional intrusion “upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
652B (1977). 
 128 Prosser, supra note 125, at 392.  This tort protects the individual against giving of 
“publicity to a matter concerning the [individual’s] private life” where such matter is not of 
legitimate concern to the public, and the nature of the disclosure would be “highly 
offensive” to a reasonable person.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 129 Prosser, supra note 125, at 389.  This tort protects the individual against the 
appropriation of his name or likeness for the use or benefit of another.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
 130 The false light tort is unlikely to apply to unauthorized dissemination of personal 
information because, under that tort, the information has to be false or erroneous.  Personal 
information transferred by primary collectors into the secondary market usually has been 
provided by individuals themselves and is, in most instances, true and correct.  An 
argument may be made that a certain “profile” that is the subject matter of a transfer may 
put an individual in a false light just by virtue of being limited and/or one-sided.  This 
argument is unlikely to succeed because no information is “complete;” therefore, it could 
lead to a rule where no information may be transferred at all.  Even if such a rule is to be 
made, it should be made on a theory other than “false light.”  This tort nonetheless may 
have a limited application to protect an individual against dissemination of erroneous 
information in situations when the information was not provided by the individual and 
when the defendant has not taken proper steps to ensure its correctness.  See, e.g., Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (allowing suit against credit 
bureau for incorrect credit report disseminated to third parties). 
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a.  Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
Invasion of privacy by “intrusion” occurs when a person intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, into the solitude or seclusion, or 
private affairs or concerns, of another in a manner that is highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.131  In the context of personal 
information, the utility of this tort is rather limited because it may apply 
only to unlawful collection of data, not to its use or disclosure.132  Courts 
generally require plaintiffs to establish the following four elements:  (i) 
an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff’s seclusion; (ii) 
which is offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (iii) as to a 
matter which is private; and (iv) which has caused anguish and 
suffering.133 
The intrusion does not have to be of a physically defined place  it 
can be of one’s “personality” or “psychological integrity.”134  Based on 
that theory, a group of American Express cardholders filed a class action 
against American Express companies for their practice of renting 
information regarding cardholder-spending habits.135  The practice 
included categorizing and ranking cardholders into tiers based on their 
spending record, and then renting this information to participating 
merchants.136  In order to draw spending profiles, American Express 
analysts considered where their cardholders shopped and how much 
they spent, as well as their behavioral characteristics and spending 
histories.137  Plaintiffs argued that, because American Express rented lists 
based on this compiled information, such practice involved the 
disclosure of private financial information and resembled cases 
involving intrusion into private financial dealings, such as bank account 
transactions.138 
 
 131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 132 See Fenrich, supra note 9, at 972 n.150 (pointing out that tort of intrusion may be 
relevant to data collection rather than dissemination); see also Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 
222-23 (noting that intrusion tort does not address such data protection practices as storage, 
use, or disclosure of personal information). 
 133 See PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1279 (Nev. 1995); Davis v. Temple, 
673 N.E.2d 737, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 904 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1990) (listing elements of tort of intrusion)... 
 134 See Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983) (“One’s 
emotional sanctum is certainly due the same expectations of privacy as one’s physical 
environment.”). 
 135 Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1352-53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 136 Id. at 1353. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 1354. 
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The court rejected the claim of intrusion, stating that the plaintiffs 
failed to establish the first element of the tort  an unauthorized 
intrusion or prying into the plaintiffs’ seclusion:  “[b]y using the 
American Express card, a cardholder is voluntarily, and necessarily, 
giving information to defendants that, if analyzed, will reveal a 
cardholder’s spending habits and shopping preferences.”139  Therefore, 
the court concluded, American Express did not commit unauthorized 
intrusion upon cardholders’ seclusion by merely compiling and renting 
information voluntarily given to it.140 
In a recent case, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire added a twist 
to this analysis.141  In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., the court had to decide 
whether an investigator may be held liable for obtaining a person’s social 
security number from a credit reporting agency without her knowledge 
or consent, as well as for obtaining her work address by making a 
pretextual phone call.142  The Remsburg court differentiated between 
information that may be reasonably expected to remain private even 
after it was disclosed by the plaintiff to a third party (social security 
number) and information that is not so “secret, secluded or private” 
(work address).143  It concluded that only in the first case may a plaintiff 
maintain a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion, and only if the 
plaintiff can prove that such intrusion would be offensive to a person of 
ordinary sensibilities.144  In determining whether the intrusion was 
sufficiently offensive, the fact finder was to consider “the degree of 
intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the 
intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into 
which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is 
invaded.”145 
These two cases reveal why the tort of intrusion upon seclusion cannot 
serve as a mechanism for regulating rights in personal information in 
general.  The intrusion upon seclusion tort protects only “secret” 
information, i.e., the information that either has never been 
communicated to anyone (Dwyer) or is highly personal in its character 
 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003). 
 142 Id. at 1004-05. 
 143 Fischer v. Hooper, 732 A.2d 396, 400 (N.H. 1999) (quoting Hamberger v. Eastman, 
106 N.H. 107, 110 (1964)). 
 144 Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1008-09. 
 145 Id. (quoting Bauer v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1109 (D. Minn. 
2001)). 
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(Remsburg).  Since the problem of unauthorized transfers of personal 
information involves information of various degrees of secrecy, disclosed 
by individuals sometimes more, sometimes less consciously, this tort is 
unable to provide a comprehensive solution. 
b.  Disclosure of Private Facts 
The disclosure tort is triggered by public disclosure of private facts in 
which the disclosure is highly offensive to a reasonable person.146  
Several requirements, however, limit the availability of this tort.  One 
limitation is that the information must be communicated to a sufficient 
number of people, so that it is “substantially certain to become. . . public 
knowledge.”147  It is a matter of degree as to how many persons must 
have seen or heard the information to constitute the “public” but, under 
the prevalent standard, it is unlikely that a sale of personal information 
by a primary collector to a secondary collector would meet the 
requirement of publicity.148 
Another limitation imposed on this cause of action is that the disclosed 
information must be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person 
of ordinary sensibilities.149  Courts have proclaimed that the disclosure 
tort “is not intended for the protection of any shrinking soul who is 
abnormally sensitive about such publicity.”150 The more personal the 
information disclosed, the greater the intrusion upon an individual’s 
 
 146 See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 147 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977); see also Tureen v. Equifax, 
Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 419 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that disclosure of health record by consumer 
credit reporting firm to insurance firm client does not rise to level of “publication”); 
Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 615 F. Supp. 299, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), rev’d on other 
grounds, 795 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that circulation of investigative report in 
personal injury suit to “only a very small group of persons” does not satisfy publicity 
requirement); Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) 
(holding that disclosure by University to State Scholarship and Loan Commission of 
student’s grades is not communication “to the public in general or to a large number of 
persons”); Robins v. Conseco Fin. Loan Co., 656 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding that disclosure of applicant’s negative credit information by lender to applicant’s 
fellow employee is not public disclosure even if fellow employee repeated information to 
others); Childs v. Williams, 825 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that letter from 
physician to patient’s employer was not public disclosure where letter was available only 
to small group of supervisors). 
 148 See MCCARTHY, supra note 60, § 5:80 (discussing publicity requirement). 
 149 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 811 (4th ed. 1987). 
 150 Prosser, supra note 125, at 397; see also Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 723 (Cal. 
1980) (“[s]ome person with extra sensitive perception. . . cannot compel this court to 
establish liability at so low a threshold.”). 
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privacy.151  The disclosure of merely neutral facts  of the kind that once 
prompted Warren and Brandeis to write their famous article  was held 
not actionable.152 
 
 151 See Bratt v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 360 (1st Cir. 1986); see also 
MCCARTHY, supra note 60, § 6:9 (listing cases involving disclosure of private facts).  
Examples of cases in which courts found a disclosure to be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person include:  Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding it 
offensive to disclose diary of deceased spouse, which revealed private thoughts regarding 
marriage and surviving spouse); Susan S. v. Israels, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997) (holding that defendant’s unauthorized reading and dissemination of plaintiff’s 
mental health records constituted serious invasion of privacy); Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 
Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that disclosure of HIV positive status is 
invasion of privacy right and offensive to reasonable person); Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 
972 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff 
had no privacy interest in blood sample); Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1996) (finding that newspaper’s public disclosure of mother’s spoken farewell to 
dead son over body in hospital room after he had been shot to death may constitute 
invasion of privacy); Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) 
(reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s claim because employer’s disclosure of mastectomy may 
be invasion of privacy); Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 829-30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) 
(deciding that anti-abortion protestor’s public disclosure of plaintiff’s name and future 
plans for abortion on poster may be invasion of privacy); Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 
382 (Miss. 1990) (affirming district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant despite 
plaintiff’s legal right in keeping hysterectomy private); Mason v. Williams Disc. Ctr., Inc., 
639 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that plaintiff had actionable claim 
against local store for posting sign implying that plaintiff wrote bad checks); Hillman v. 
Columbia County, 474 N.W.2d 913, 920 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (finding potential violation of 
constitutional right to privacy in prison’s disclosure of inmate’s HIV status to fellow 
inmates). 
 152 Examples of situations in which courts have found that a reasonable person would 
not be highly offended by the disclosure of neutral information include:  Howell by Goerdt 
v. Tribune Entm’t, 106 F.3d 215, 220-21 (7th Cir. 1997) (airing television show in which 
plaintiff was depicted as rowdy teenager is not invasion of privacy); Wood v. Nat’l 
Computer Sys., Inc., 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that defendant’s inadvertent 
revelation of plaintiff’s passing test score to one person is not highly objectionable); Lodge 
v. Shell Oil Co., 747 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that termination from employment 
is not private fact); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 
1191 (D. Ariz. 1998) (broadcasting undercover investigation of plaintiff’s medical lab was 
not highly offensive); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Nat’l Catholic Reporter Publ’n Co., 978 F. 
Supp. 1195, 1200 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (disclosing person’s religious affiliation is not 
defamatory); Galdauckas v. Interstate Hotels Corp., 901 F. Supp. 454, 470 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(writing plaintiff’s age on birthday card circulated to fellow employees is not invasion of 
privacy); Grunseth v. Marriott Corp., 872 F. Supp. 1069, 1075-76 (D.D.C. 1995) (staying 
overnight in a certain hotel is not grounds for invasion of privacy suit); Wolf v. Regardie, 
553 A.2d 1213, 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (publishing article about plaintiff’s wealth is not 
private matter highly offensive to reasonable person); Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters Local 1264 
v. Mun. of Anchorage, 973 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Alaska 1999) (holding that municipal 
employees do not have legitimate expectation of privacy in their salaries); Dwyer v. Am. 
Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (selling plaintiff’s credit card 
information is not unauthorized intrusion); Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, 452 A.2d 
689, 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (affirming motion for summary judgment because 
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In most instances the lifestyle information that is the subject of 
commercial transfers does not reach the level of “highly personal and 
embarrassing.”153  Combined with the fact that a transfer of personal 
information from the primary collector to the secondary market is 
unlikely to be viewed as public disclosure, that more or less disqualifies 
this tort as a possible cause of action for plaintiffs attempting to control 
the use and transfer of their personal information. 
c.  Invasion of Privacy by Appropriation and the Right of Publicity 
The appropriation tort, as well as the related right of publicity,154 
consists of the appropriation of the plaintiff’s name, picture, or likeness 
for the defendant’s benefit or advantage.155  Classic examples that give 
rise to both torts include unauthorized use of an individual’s name or 
picture to advertise the defendant’s product,156 to add luster to the name 
of a corporation,157 or for other business purposes.158  The appropriation 
tort or the right of publicity is recognized virtually in every state through 
either statutory or common law,159 the difference between the two often 
 
disclosure that plaintiff bought expensive house is not invasion of privacy); Johnson v. 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (sustaining 
defendant’s demurrer because revealing that plaintiff found and returned large sum of 
money was laudatory and not invasion of privacy). 
 153 See, e.g., King County v. Sheehan, 57 P.3d 307, 316 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (opining 
that state statute based on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS would not protect names of 
county police officers from disclosure because statute “only applies to personal information 
that employees would not normally share with strangers”); Webb v. City of Shreveport, 371 
So. 2d 316, 319 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that people have no reasonable expectations of 
privacy as to their identity or as to where they live or work). 
 154 The difference between the appropriation tort and the right of publicity stems not 
from the actions of the defendant but rather from “the nature of the plaintiff’s rights and 
the nature of the resulting injury.  [W]hile the appropriation branch of the right of privacy 
is invaded by an injury to the psyche, the right of publicity is infringed by an injury to the 
pocketbook.”  Prosser, supra note 125, at 402. 
 155 See Prosser, supra note 125, at 401. 
 156 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (recognizing, for 
first time, individual’s rights in identity, this case involved artist whose picture was used 
by insurance company to promote life insurance). 
 157 See, e.g., Cordell v. Detective Publ’n Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Tenn. 1968) (involving 
claim of invasion of privacy by appropriation to add luster to corporation’s name when 
defendant company published story about murder of plaintiff-mother’s daughter); 
Martinez v. Democrat-Herald Publ’g Co., 669 P.2d 818 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that 
defendant’s portrayal of plaintiff as drug user in photograph published in newspaper did 
not constitute appropriation). 
 158 MCCARTHY, supra note 60, § 5:61. 
 159 See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851-54 (W. Page Keeton ed., 
4th ed. 1987) (discussing appropriation tort and protection of one’s name, image, or 
likeness under statutory law in states such as New York). 
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being ignored.160 
In recent years, plaintiffs in three different state court cases (Shibley v. 
Time, Inc.,161 Dwyer v. American Express Co.,162 and U.S. News and World 
Report v. Avrahami163) attempted to apply some form of the appropriation 
tort to enjoin unauthorized dissemination of personal information 
through the sale of mailing lists.  All those attempts have failed.164 
In Shibley, a class action against Time Magazine, Esquire, Playboy, Ladies 
Home Journal, and the issuer of American Express credit cards, the court 
rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants’ practice of selling 
subscription lists to direct-mail advertisers without the prior consent of 
subscribers amounted to an “appropriation of one’s personality.”165  The 
court opined that the “appropriation or exploitation of one’s personality” 
recognized by Ohio law may be invoked only in “those situations where 
the plaintiff’s name or likeness is displayed to the public to indicate that 
the plaintiff endorses the defendant’s product or business.”166  The 
Shibley court rejected plaintiffs’ claim as a matter of either privacy or 
property right. 
 
 
 160 In this paper, the “right of publicity” and the “tort of appropriation” are often used 
interchangeably. 
 161 Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
 162 Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 163 U.S. News & World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518, 
at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996). 
 164 Another case that deals with unauthorized commercial dissemination of personal 
information has yet to reach trial.  In Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
439 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1999); certification. of class action aff’d sub nom. Weld v. Glaxo 
Wellcome, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 2001), a group of customers sued a pharmacy for 
sharing customer prescription information with certain drug manufacturers.  The court 
rejected the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, acknowledging that, as a matter of 
law, CVS’s marketing activities with drug manufacturers could amount to a violation of 
customers’ privacy as well as to a “sale of the plaintiffs’ names, addresses and personal 
prescription information, from which the defendants profited.”  Id. at *20.  The court 
opined that although Massachusetts did not expressly recognize a separate cause of action 
for tortious misappropriation of private information, and although that claim was probably 
preempted by a state statute prohibiting the use of an individual’s name for “the purposes 
of trade without his written consent,” the plaintiffs should still be allowed to proceed with 
their claim.  Id. at *21 n.19.  The court concluded that the “facts alleged by plaintiffs, (i.e. the 
use of plaintiffs’ private information for the defendants’ financial gain), falls [sic] within the 
scope of [the appropriation] cause of action.”  Id. at *22.  That conclusion does not by itself 
imply that the court views personal information as the property of the plaintiffs, but it does 
not preclude such interpretation either. 
 165 Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339. 
 166 Id. 
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In Dwyer, the court used the same argument167 to deny relief to a group 
of American Express cardholders who claimed that American Express’s 
practice of selling their spending profiles to participating merchants 
amounted to the appropriation of cardholders’ names and perceived 
lifestyles.168 The court opined that “an individual name has value only 
when it is associated with one of defendants’ lists”169 and that 
“[d]efendants create value by categorizing and aggregating these 
names.”170  Implicit in that conclusion was the court’s view that, to the 
extent personal information may be viewed as property, that property 
belongs to the one who collects it. 
The arguments in Avrahami resemble those made in Shibley and Dwyer.  
In that case, an individual plaintiff sued U.S. News & World Report for 
renting out his name (or rather one of the names he used) as a part of its 
subscriber lists.  The appellate court of Virginia rejected the plaintiff’s 
claim, stating that the tort of appropriation is intended only to give 
redress to a person whose name, portrait, or picture was used for 
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade.171  The inclusion of an 
individual name in a mailing list did not constitute a use for either 
advertising or trade, as defined by Virginia statute.172  Moreover, the 
court stated that Mr. Avrahami had no property rights in the names he 
used, therefore U.S. News neither violated the statute nor committed 
common law conversion by including his name as part of a mailing list 
exchange.173 
It is not quite clear how broadly the Avrahami opinion should be read.  
On the one hand, the language of the opinion is rather sweeping  
individuals have no property right in the names they use.174  On the other 
hand, that broad language may be qualified by the fact that the name in 
question was not Mr. Avrahami’s true name, i.e., arguably, it was not 
really a part of his personality.  The court repeatedly emphasized the fact 
that Mr. Avrahami had used “nineteen names. . . in the past five 
 
 167 Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1355 (holding that tort of appropriation is inapplicable because 
it only protects “a person from having his name or image used for commercial purposes 
without consent”). 
 168 See id. at 1356. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 U.S. News & World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518, 
at *16 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996). 
 172 See id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
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years,”175 that he “had intentionally used a false name”176 and 
“affirmatively created this litigation by using a false name.”177  Finally, it 
is possible that the court may believe that individuals have property 
rights in their name (or true name), but that the practice of selling or 
renting mailing lists does not give rise to either a statutory appropriation 
or a common law conversion because such practice does not constitute 
exercise of dominion or control of such magnitude as to deprive a person 
of possession of his name.178  Or, using the words of the opinion, such 
practice does not “invade any property right [an individual] may have in 
his name.”179 
Finally, the most recent unsuccessful attempt to the appropriation 
theory for protection of personal information is Remsburg,180 a case 
concerning a woman killed by a stalker who acted on the information 
supplied by a private investigator.  The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
did not allow a misappropriation claim against the investigator, 
explaining that the tort “does not protect one’s name per se; rather it 
protects the value associated with that name.”181  There is no cause of 
action if a person’s name was published for purposes other than taking 
advantage of the “reputation, prestige or other value” associated with 
the person.182  In this case, the investigator capitalized not on the victim’s 
reputation or prestige but rather on his client’s willingness to pay.183  
Accordingly, the court held that “a person whose personal information is 
sold does not have a cause of action for appropriation against the 
investigator who sold the information.” 184 
 
 175 Id. at *4, *15. 
 176 Id. at *14. 
 177 Id. at *18.  The court viewed with skepticism Mr. Avrahami’s motives for 
commencing the litigation, which appeared to be a public relations campaign.  Mr. 
Avrahami had made a statement that “one of the primary reasons he filed suit was that the 
notoriety would help him meet ‘chicks.’”  Id. at *15.  Later, Mr. Avrahami wrote a letter to 
the Direct Marketing Association (the “DMA”), proposing a mechanism for handling 
personal information that requires explicit consent of consumers.  For the text of the letter 
see http://www.epic.org/privacy/junk_mail/DMAletter.html (June 24, 1996).  The DMA 
president  has  rejected  the  suggestion.  For the text of the reply, see http://www.epic.org 
/privacy/junk_mail/DMAresponse.html (July 15, 1996). 
 178 See Avrahami, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518, at *18. 
 179 Id. (emphasis added). 
 180 Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003). 
 181 Id. at 1009 (quoting Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 182 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. d at 382-83 (1977)). 
 183 Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1010. 
 184 Id.  The Remsburg court nevertheless concluded that the defendant may be held 
liable under the general negligence theory.  It held: 
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The lesson of the outlined opinions is quite uniform:  courts are 
reluctant to expand the scope of the appropriation tort beyond 
advertising and related purposes.  Although courts admit that personal 
information compiled by collectors is property, they deny that it was 
property before it was collected.  It is easy to see a flaw in the logic of the 
courts:  not only do they equate property with monetary value (which is 
not always the case  my drawings may have no monetary value but 
they are still my property), but even when individual personal 
information has a price tag attached (Remsburg), they still refuse to 
enforce the plaintiff’s right to it.  Thus, in their current form, none of the 
privacy-related torts are conceptually suited to protect an individual’s 
personal information. 
B.  Property or Torts? 
As the preceding discussion shows, the current law recognizes neither 
personal nor property rights of individuals in personal information.  
That conceptual lacuna makes the choice of an appropriate legal theory 
particularly important.  In this section, I argue in favor of the property 
regime as opposed to the tort regime, for the following three reasons:  (i) 
the torts approach cannot support a consistent, workable mechanism for 
the enforcement of information privacy rights; (ii) U.S. law, explicitly or 
implicitly, already regards personal information as property; and (iii) the 
property regime better serves the interests of individual parties and 
society in general. 
Several scholars have argued that individual privacy with respect to 
personal information should be protected through the expansion of 
either the disclosure tort185 or the appropriation tort.186  These proposals 
 
The threats posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the risk 
of criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an investigator has a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third person’s personal 
information to a client. . . .  This is especially true when, as in this case, the 
investigator does not know the client or the client’s purpose in seeking the 
information. 
Id. at 1008. 
 185 See Flavio L. Komuves, We’ve Got Your Number:  An Overview of Legislation and 
Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 574 (1998) (arguing that courts should “take affirmative steps to 
prohibit [social security number] and name dissemination” by expanding use of disclosure 
and appropriation torts); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1283, 1312 (2000) (arguing in favor of tort regime over property regime because it 
“avoids the trap of alienability the perverse incentives that a market in alienable personal 
data would create.”). 
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may mitigate some of the current problems but would leave most 
significant issues unresolved. 
As for the disclosure tort, it protects only information that is kept 
secret.  The secrecy model of privacy, however, is not able to address 
many of the vital personal interests involved in the modern information 
economy.187  Specifically, that model fails to take into account that in 
today’s world “individuals are encompassed within a web of 
information about what they do, and when and why.”188  Most of that 
information is voluntarily disclosed by individuals, and therefore is not 
eligible for protection under the disclosure tort. 
Another problem with the tort of disclosure is that, even if the 
boundaries of protected information were expanded, courts would still 
have to measure alleged violations against a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  That raises both moral and practical concerns because what is 
reasonably private varies dramatically across different social, economic, 
and cultural groups.189  Someone who lives in a mansion would probably 
have different expectations of privacy than someone who lives on the 
street.  Unless we, as a society, are prepared to treat individuals in 
different socio-economic groups differently, we cannot accept this 
approach.  In addition, as concerns surrounding transfer of personal 
information become increasingly international in scope, what is or is not 
reasonable will depend on the standard adopted in each particular 
jurisdiction.  For instance, as has been already suggested,190 American 
companies trying to qualify for the “Safe Harbor” may end up adopting 
two different standards  the higher one for European customers and 
the lower one for domestic customers. 
Making “reasonable expectations of privacy” a cornerstone of a 
regulatory structure is problematic even on the most basic theoretical 
 
 186 See Fenrich, supra note 9, at 994-1003 (arguing that courts should apply either 
appropriation tort or right of publicity to protect individuals from unwanted commercial 
use of their personal information); see also Mary Jo Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in 
the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 14 NOTRE DAME  J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1011, 1027 (2000) 
(discussing that various torts, including tort of appropriation, “provide the basis for causes 
of action for violation of information privacy,” noted in Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in 
Cyberspace:  Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1159 
(1997)). 
 187 See discussion supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. 
 188 NIMMER, supra note 98, at 16-5. 
 189 Cf. Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search?  Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment 
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 125 n.18 (2002) (noting, in context 
of Fourth Amendment inquiry, that “reasonable expectations of privacy” are formed by 
individual’s political and cultural background). 
 190 See discussion supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
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level because the question begs the answer  what expectations are 
reasonable depends on the existing practice, which in turn depends on 
the allocation of legal entitlements.  At this point, the balance of rights is 
so heavily tilted in favor of collectors, that it is probably unreasonable to 
expect that our personal information will not be abused. 
The proposal to expand the appropriation tort does not create a 
comprehensive solution to the problem either.  Both courts and scholars 
have pointed out that the tort of appropriation differs from other 
privacy-based torts in that, unlike the other three torts that safeguard the 
personal rights of an individual, this tort is proprietary in nature,191 it 
protects “a right of value upon which the plaintiff [should be able to] 
capitalize by selling licenses.”192 
Expanding the appropriation tort to cover personal information would 
mean implicitly recognizing the proprietary nature of such 
information.193   But why should a proprietary interest be regulated 
entirely through torts?  Torts give individuals only negative rights by 
protecting recognized interests of individuals from infringement by 
others.  Why shouldn’t the owner of personal information have 
affirmative rights as well, including the right to alienate it like any other 
property?  The question is particularly salient in the American legal 
system, which disfavors restrictions on free alienation of property. 
The appropriation tort is, in essence, a form of the tort of conversion 
that protects an individual’s proprietary interest from 
misappropriation.194  No one suggests, however, that claims of 
individuals with respect to real or personal property should be regulated 
entirely through the tort of conversion.  In other words, the tort theory 
can help to regulate some incidents of ownership; but where proprietary 
interests are involved, it plays only a secondary role compared to the 
property regime. 
 
 191 See Prosser, supra note 125, at 406 (“It seems sufficiently evident that appropriation 
tort is quite a different matter from intrusion, disclosure of private facts, or a false light in 
the public eye.  The interest protected is not so much a mental as a proprietary one, in the 
exclusive use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness as an aspect of his identity.”). 
 192 Id. 
 193 In fact, in many areas of the law, personal information is already viewed as 
property, just not the property of an individual.  See discussion supra notes 118-22 and 
accompanying text. 
 194 “Conversion” is defined as the wrongful possession or disposition of another’s 
property as if it were one’s own; an act or series of acts of willful interference, without 
lawful justification, with a chattel in a manner inconsistent with another’s right, whereby 
that other person is deprived of the use and possession of the chattel.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 333 (7th ed. 1999). 
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On a more abstract level, the choice between the tort regime and the 
property regime for the protection of personal information means the 
choice between property rules and liability rules as defined in the 
seminal article authored by Calabresi and Melamed.195  According to 
their theory, an “entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent 
that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder 
must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the 
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”196  The liability rule protects an 
entitlement in the sense that holders must be compensated whenever the 
entitlement is taken away from them without their consent, the value of 
the entitlement being “determined by some organ of the state rather than 
by the parties themselves.”197 
A society chooses which rule to employ in relation to a particular 
entitlement based on a variety of considerations.  For Calabresi and 
Melamed, the main reason to choose one rule over another is efficiency, 
although the authors recognize that other reasons, such as distributional 
goals198 and avoiding moral harm to the individual or the society at 
large,199 are also valid considerations.  The property rule requires the 
least amount of state intervention since the value of an entitlement is 
determined by two willing participants in a voluntary transaction.200  
Therefore, unless there are special circumstances, the property rule is the 
most efficient.  The liability rule may be preferred where a “market 
valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient,” i.e., “either 
unavailable or too expensive compared to a collective valuation,”201 or 
where it “facilitates a combination of efficiency and distributive results 
which would be difficult to achieve under a property rule.”202 
From the utilitarian perspective, it may appear more efficient to value 
personal information objectively, thus avoiding the costs of negotiations 
with each particular individual.  The preference for the liability rule, 
however, would mean that individual entitlements to personal 
information recognized under tort law would have to be enforced 
 
 195 See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing different 
entitlement regimes in society). 
 196 Id. at 1092. 
 197 Id. 
 198 See id. at 1110. 
 199 Id. at 1112-13 (discussing external costs in constructing rules of alienability). 
 200 See id. at 1092. 
 201 Id. at 1110. 
 202 Id. 
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exclusively by litigation, on a case-by-case basis, which would involve 
considerable expenditures of funds and time, both by litigants and the 
judicial system.  Moreover, in order to recover, the plaintiff will have to 
prove actual damages, which most likely will be trivial.  That by itself 
will discourage people from bringing lawsuits against those who violate 
their rights in personal information, thereby making the rule inefficient. 
The choice of the liability regime is even less persuasive if utility is not 
limited to efficiency but instead is understood, in Mill’s words, as “utility 
in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being.”203  By that, Mill spoke to everyone’s right of free 
choice, which may be curtailed only to prevent “harm to others.”204  In 
light of this understood utility, a society may be justified in interfering 
with a voluntary transfer of personal information between an individual 
and a collector only if the society can show that allowing a free exchange 
would hurt someone else or the public in general. 
Arguments have been made that the property regime may hurt the 
public in general:205  if collectors are forced to negotiate with individuals 
for the sale of personal information, transaction costs would rise and the 
scope of personal information available to various industries would 
decrease.206  Even assuming arguendo that a certain decrease does 
follow,207 it is far from clear that it would noticeably hurt the public.  
Most probably, under Mill’s theory, it would be one of those 
“constructive injur[ies] which a person causes to society, by conduct 
which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions 
perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself [and] which 
society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human 
freedom.”208 
 
 203 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. 1, ¶ 11 (New York 1869). 
 204 Id. 
 205 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:  Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1032 (1995) (arguing in favor of liability rule 
rather than property rule because liability rule “possess[es] an information-forcing” quality 
which facilitates “more efficient trade”); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil 
Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 334-35 (1996) (arguing in favor of liability rules to promote 
bargaining around compulsory licenses). 
 206 See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 205, at 1093-94 (arguing that, in case of dispute, 
liability rule would minimize costs by facilitating exchange of information, while property 
right rule would lead to deadlocks in negotiations).  But see Robert P. Merges, Contracting 
into Liability Rules:  Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. 
REV. 1293, 1304-05 (1996) (showing that Ayres & Talley’s model is inapplicable when more 
than two parties are negotiating). 
 207 See discussion infra notes 234-49 and accompanying text. 
 208 MILL, supra note 203, ch. 4, ¶ 11. 
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From a broader perspective, not limited to utilitarian or libertarian 
arguments, it would be even more difficult to justify the choice of the 
liability regime  the regime that, on the one hand, recognizes the 
alienability of personal information and gives the initial entitlement 
therein to individuals but, on the other hand, allows anyone but 
individuals to decide whether that entitlement should be transferred and 
at what price.  It is preferable from the viewpoint of individual fairness 
and collective benefit, as well as logic and intellectual consistency, to 
regulate personal information through the property rule, which affords 
the individual maximum control over personal information and allows 
all interested parties to enter into mutually acceptable transactions 
without tying up valuable societal resources.  Privacy torts may still play 
an important role under specific circumstances defining those torts  as 
a separate claim (e.g., the tort of disclosure where the defendant 
published highly embarrassing information voluntarily supplied by the 
plaintiff for a narrow purpose) or an additional theory for recovery.  
However, property should serve as a general paradigm for new 
legislation regulating issues relating to personal information. 
V. WHOSE PROPERTY? 
The choice of the property regime for regulating personal information 
does not by itself determine how property rights should be allocated 
between the individual and collectors.  Why should the individual’s 
claim to her personal information be prior to the claim of collectors?  On 
the intuitive level, the answer is that this information exists regardless of 
whether or not it has been collected.  It exists as an extension of the 
individual’s personality  just like the individual’s name or likeness 
that are protected by the right of publicity: 
if one’s own image, for example, is treated as an object capable of 
‘being yours or mine,’ why should it not be claimed by the person 
who is its natural source?  To the extent it is available as some 
person’s property. . . its source would seem to have the strongest 
claim.209 
Various theories of property may serve to support this intuitive 
conclusion.  Most recognized among those210 are the Lockean labor-
 
 209 Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?  The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 
383, 418 (1999). 
 210 See Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy:  A New Legal Paradigm?  Examined Lives: 
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1380 (2000) 
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desert theory,211 the utilitarian theory,212 and the “personality” theory. 213 
A.  Locke:  Labor-Desert Theory 
The labor-desert theory, at first glance, seems to protect the rights of 
collectors rather than the rights of individuals because it suggests that a 
person who invests her labor in a common good acquires a property 
right in it.214  At a closer look, however, one would reach a different 
conclusion.  Locke based his theory on the assumption that in the 
primitive state of nature there are enough unclaimed goods so that 
everyone can appropriate the objects of their labor without infringing 
upon goods that have been appropriated by others.215  It follows that one 
may acquire property rights in a good by investing one’s labor only if the 
good is not already owned by someone else. 
At the same time, Locke’s primary underlying assumption is that 
“every Man has a Property in his own Person.”216  A “person” for Locke is 
“a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and 
places.”217  Using modern terms, Locke defines a person through the 
individual’s personal identity, which, among other things, should 
include the individual’s personal information  the unique collection of 
facts that makes the individual who she is.  If that is the case, then 
everyone has an original property right in her personal information, i.e., 
 
(“Mainstream property theorists recognize two main theoretical justifications for 
ownership:  Lockean labor-desert theory, and a more explicitly utilitarian theory that 
focuses on economic efficiency.”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 
GEO. L.J. 287, 288 (1988) (“The main alternative to a labor justification is a ‘personality 
theory’ that describes property as an expression of the self.”). 
 211 See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed. rev. 
1963) (1690) (developing theory of property based on individual investment of labor in 
common good). 
 212 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Morals and Legislations, in 1 SELECT 
EXTRACTS FROM THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 1-4, 11-12 (Thoemmes Press 1995) (1843) 
(developing theory of property of law based on maximization of welfare). 
 213 See generally GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. M. Knox 
trans., 1942) (developing theory of property and personhood). 
 214 See, e.g., Harris S. Gordon, et al., Customer Relationship Management:  A Senior 
Management Guide to Technology for Creating a Customer-Centric Business, at http://www.the-
dma.org/bookstore/cgi/displaybook?product_id=009163 (last visited Mar. 1, 2003) 
(regarding personally identifiable data as property of collectors who have invested in 
compiling databases). 
 215 See LOCKE, supra note 211, at 33. 
 216 See id. at 328-29. 
 217 See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING II. xxvii, § 11, 448-
49 (A. Frager ed., 1894) (1690). 
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personal information does not exist in the state of nature, it is already 
owned.  Under Lockean theory, therefore, collectors of personal 
information should not be permitted to acquire a property right that is 
superior to the property right of the individual who is the subject matter 
of the collected data  just as someone who picks flowers in a 
neighbor’s front yard may not acquire property rights in these flowers 
superior to the property rights of the neighbor.218 
B.  Utilitarian Theory 
Under the utilitarian theory, rights should be allocated so as to 
maximize human satisfaction or benefit.219  Modern utilitarians have 
interpreted this to mean mainly economic efficiency.220  The role of 
property law in such interpretation is to facilitate wealth-maximizing 
transactions.221 
For that reason, in deciding “whether the law should allow a magazine 
to sell its subscriber list to another magazine without obtaining the 
subscribers’ consent,”222 Richard Posner looks only to transaction-cost 
considerations.  Posner concludes that the property right in personal 
information should be assigned away from the individual because to the 
seller “the cost of obtaining the subscriber approval would be high 
relative to the value of the list.”223  On the other hand, the cost to the 
subscriber would be low since the disclosed information is trivial; 
therefore, the purchaser of the list would not be able to “use it to impose 
substantial costs on the subscribers.”224 
This view is vulnerable on both empirical and theoretical grounds.  
Empirical studies do not seem to support the assumption that the 
assignment of property rights in personal information to its collectors 
 
 218 See infra notes 311-16 and accompanying text (discussing whether collector should 
have any property rights in acquired data). 
 219 See generally BENTHAM, supra note 212. 
 220 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36-39, 271-89 (4th ed. 1988) 
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 357 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE] (applying economic 
approach to law and legal doctrine).  See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347-48 (1967) (developing theory of property rights and 
externalities, including costs and benefits). 
 221 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968) 
(arguing that rational actors seek to maximize their wealth when they covet common 
property as their own). 
 222 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 398 (1978). 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 398-99. 
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reduces transaction costs.  As pointed out by Kenneth C. Laudon, those 
who advocate maintaining the status quo for the sake of efficiency “are 
ignorant of the enormous cost of the existing set of arrangements,”225 
under which individuals are bombarded by calls, e-mails, and mailings 
that they do not wish to receive. 
It has been estimated that telemarketers make eighteen million calls a 
day,226 the vast majority of which are unsuccessful.227  Each year, one 
hundred million trees are cut down in the United States to produce 4.5 
million tons of junk mail; 44% of it goes straight to the waste dumps 
unopened and unread.228 
Studies have shown that, frustrated with inadequate laws and 
practices, individuals spend inordinate amounts of time and money 
trying to protect themselves from unwanted intrusion.  These costs 
constitute a privacy toll and are associated with stopping spam, junk mail, 
and telemarketing calls, avoiding identity theft,229 and protecting privacy 
on the Internet.230  A privacy-sensitive family could spend between $200 
 
 225 Laudon, supra note 13, at 102-03 (reporting that out of 14.5 billion catalogues 
distributed to homes in 1994, 75% were tossed out within five seconds of receipt). 
 226 Liz Crenshaw, Telemarketers & Direct Mail, NBC4.COM, available at 
http://www.nbc4.com/frequentlyaskedforarchive/1165499/detail.html (last visited Mar. 
1, 2003). 
 227 Laudon, supra note 13, at 103. 
 228 See Native Forest Network, supra note 8. 
 229 See  Identity-Theft  Complaints  Almost  Double  in  2002,   at  http://www.cnn.com 
/2003/TECH/ptech/01/22/identity.theft.ap/index.html (Jan. 23, 2003) (reporting that, 
according to Justice Department, up to 700,000 people in United States may be victimized 
by identity bandits each year).  The FTC has reported that the number of identity theft 
complaints rose from about 86,000 in 2001 to about 162,000 in 2002.  Of last year’s incidents, 
42% involved credit card fraud.  Other major categories involved fraudulent bank and cell 
phone accounts.  According to the FTC, it costs an average victim more than $1,000 in 
expenses to cope with the damage to her accounts and reputation.  Id. 
 230 Elements of the Privacy Toll: 
Identity Theft      
  Credit Watch  $39.95 a year for two adults $79.90 
  Credit Reports  
$8.50 a year for two 
adults at two credit 
bureaus 
$34.00 
  
(There are three major credit 
bureaus.  These services will 
cover all three.) 
  
Telemarketing 
Avoidance       
  Caller ID with Name   $7.50 per month $90.00 
  Unlisted Number  $1.50 per month $18.00 
Internet Privacy      
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and $300 and many hours annually to protect their privacy.231  
Consumers, businesses, and the public at large pay the privacy toll.232  In 
a recent report to Congress, the FTC estimated that online retail sales lost 
due to privacy concerns may be worth as much as $18 billion.233 
In addition to the empirical evidence disclosing the losses resulting 
from the current allocation of property rights in personal information, 
economists have argued that the current property regime is inefficient by 
its very design since it generates externalities.234  In this context, 
 
  Anonymization Service  $50 per year $50.00 
Junk Mail      
  Opting out  12/year @ $.50 per opt-out $6.00 
  Total Annual Costs    $277.90  
Time Losses      
  Spam download time    5 hours/year 
  Spam deletion time    2 hours/year 
Intangible and 
Unmeasured Costs      
  Higher credit costs due to ID theft     
  
Costs incurred directly by ID 
theft victims (hundreds or 
thousands of dollars per 
victim)  
   
  
Disruptions and aggravation 
from unwanted 
telemarketing calls  
   
  
Consumer losses due to 
telemarketing fraud that rely 
on targeted marketing data  
   
  
Internet service outages and 
delays due to spam (losses to 
consumers and to businesses) 
   
  
Internet costs due to capacity 
necessary to support spam 
(costs to ISPs, users, and 
others) 
  
 
Gellman, supra note 29. 
 231 See id. 
 232 Id. (noting that people will not purchase items on Internet and otherwise when they 
fear that their personal information may be misused). 
 233 See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices                     
in the Electronic Marketplace 2 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000 
/privacy2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2003); see also Gellman, supra note 29 (pointing out 
that consumers routinely abandon shopping carts on websites because of demands for too 
much personal information). 
 234 Laudon, supra note 13, at 103 (criticizing Posner for failure “to account for the 
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externalities mean that social costs (economic as well as non-economic) 
associated with the accumulation and trading of personal information 
are not fully borne by primary and secondary collectors.  Instead, part of 
the cost is imposed on individuals whose privacy is invaded, and 
another part on society in general.235  The “subsidy” enjoyed by collectors 
encourages wasteful behavior  companies over-invest in reaching 
consumers who do not wish to hear from them and under-invest in 
technology that would permit them to satisfy individual privacy 
preferences.236 
Proponents of the law and economics theory often argue that 
“restrictions on the free flow of information in the name of privacy are 
generally not social wealth maximizing, because they inhibit 
decisionmaking, increase transaction costs, and encourage fraud.”237  
They maintain that the more information about an individual is 
available, the more difficult it is for people to lie about themselves, and 
the cheaper it is for their counterparties to evaluate the risks associated 
with dealing with them.238 
The efficiency of this regime, however, is less than obvious.  In the real 
world, information about an individual is never absolutely complete or 
accurate.239  It is also never objective in the sense that the very method of 
its selection (what facts are relevant) reflects certain ideology as well as 
biases and prejudices.  If an individual has no control over dissemination 
of her personal information, does not know what facts may determine a 
 
negative information externalities inherent in the new information age”). 
 235 Id. at 99 (citing “regulatory agencies, congressional hearings, federally funded study 
groups, and a small industry of privacy experts” as examples of expenditures imposed on 
society at large). 
 236 See Schwartz, supra note 106, at 833; see also Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing 
Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 87 (2003) (suggesting that telemarketers create externalities 
by ignoring costs they impose on consumers and other telemarketers). 
 237 Murphy, supra note 16, at 2382 (summarizing principal arguments of law and 
economics scholars); see also Posner, supra note 222, at 397-400 (arguing that privacy claims 
often reflect attempts of plaintiffs to perpetrate fraud by maintaining public image they do 
not deserve); George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 623, 632-33 (1980) (“The more costly the acquisition of knowledge, the more 
expensive it becomes to enter into transactions with new parties.  We should expect less 
mobility of laborers, creditors, etc., and some increase in the dispersion of prices.”).  See 
generally Symposium, The Law and Economics of Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 621 (1980). 
 238 See Stigler, supra note 237, at 628-33. 
 239 See  Privacy  and  Consumer  Profiling,  available  at  http://www.epic.org/privacy 
/profiling/#introduction#introduction (last updated Feb. 3, 2003) (reporting serious 
problems with accuracy of profiling data).  For instance, in April 2001, former Privacy 
Foundation CTO Richard Smith requested his ChoicePoint dossier and concluded that the 
file contained “more misinformation than correct information.”  Id. 
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counterparty’s decision, and has no ability to correct errors in her record, 
that by itself may lead to economically inefficient behavior by all parties 
to a transaction.  Furthermore, many potential participants may be 
deterred from entering the market much in the same way many able 
candidates are already deterred from entering political life by fear of 
unlimited exposure and unwanted publicity.240  As a result, the legal 
regime that, in the name of efficiency, imposes the burden of protecting 
privacy on individuals is likely, in the long run, to be inefficient. 
Even if this law and economics analysis were correct, the collective 
lack of privacy may still be inefficient.241  The unlimited dissemination of 
personal information restricts individuals’ ability to present themselves 
differently to different people, which, apart from any fraud, is important 
for establishing new relationships as well as for personal change and 
growth.242  Unavoidable clerical errors243 put at risk the legitimate interest 
people have in their reputations.244  This interest is not only personal in 
nature  it is also an investment, similar to the investment a corporation 
makes in its good will; therefore, on a societal scale, damage to personal 
reputations results in an economic loss to the society as a whole.  These 
costs, shifted from specific market participants to the public at large are, 
however, not accounted for in the current property regime. 
 
 
 240 See, e.g., Gerald F. Seb, Powell’s Exit Sparks Debate Over Shape of Politics in America, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1995, at A1 (stating that Powell’s reluctance to enter race is partly due 
to concern for family’s privacy). 
 241 See Gellman, supra note 29, § 3.F.3 (arguing that greater use of personal information 
for enhancement of private sector marketing activities has significant slippery slope 
problem, and that targeted marketing might be greatly enhanced if personal income tax 
records or medical records were freely available to marketers).  However, it is clear that 
most Americans would not tolerate this type of activity.  Id. 
 242 See Graham, supra note 97, at 1404. 
 243 Stigler concedes that “[e]rror is of course unavoidable” but argues that “there are 
substantial incentives for information agencies to keep the error in reasonable bounds.  The 
rejection of a sound debtor or acceptance of a deadbeat are clearly costly to a merchant.”  
Stigler, supra note 237, at 626.  In a law and economics dream world, with complete 
information on all sides of a transaction and zero transaction costs, this argument would be 
true.  However, in the real world, neither merchants nor customers learn about clerical 
errors as soon as they happen.  Thus, the cost of such errors may factor into a price 
differential.  The value of an error to a customer may significantly exceed its value to a 
merchant, i.e., the merchant will have no incentive to correct it.  In theory, a customer could 
go to a different merchant, the one that produces fewer errors.  Yet, in a world in which 
individuals have no control over their personal information, how will the customer 
compare which merchant keeps the most accurate files? 
 244 See Murphy, supra note 16, at 2385 (arguing that reputations are valuable personal 
assets). 
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A standard remedy245 to the externalities problem is “internalizing” the 
costs, i.e., reallocating property rights246 or creating other incentives that 
would spread the costs of producing a benefit to all parties involved.247  
Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, who view privacy as an externality 
problem, explain: 
I may be adversely affected by the way people use information 
about me and there may be no way that I can easily convey my 
preferences to these parties. The solution to this externality problem 
is to assign property rights in information about individuals to those 
individuals.  They can then contract with other parties, such as 
direct mail distributors, about how they might use the 
information.248  
To summarize my arguments, both the empirical evidence and 
theoretical considerations of economists support the view that the 
current property regime with respect to personal information is 
inefficient and should be revised.  Even if, as a result of that revision, 
transaction costs rise, they will rise only as far as necessary to pay for the 
cost of invading privacy.249  Additionally, the increased cost would 
discourage “the obnoxious use of information that could undermine the 
foundations of a free society if left unchecked.”250  As Kenneth C. Laudon 
has pointed out, “[t]here should be no free lunch when it comes to 
invading privacy.”251 
 
 
 245 Some economists have argued that it may be in the interest of society as a whole not 
to fight externalities if doing so would discourage some socially valuable activity.  For 
instance, taxing a manufacturer for pollution that damages a neighboring property is 
inefficient compared to simply removing or compensating the owners of the damaged 
properties.  See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960) 
(comparing two regimes  one where business is liable for damage it causes, and other 
where injured party is held responsible for damage to its property).  However, as Kenneth 
C. Laudon correctly points out, “[t]his argument makes little sense when applied to either 
privacy invasion or to environmental pollution on a massive scale.  How do you move 
away from privacy invasion and avoid experiencing the costs?”  Laudon, supra note 13, at 
103. 
 246 See Demsetz, supra note 220, at 352 (noting that internalizing usually involves 
change in property rights). 
 247 See id. at 347-57. 
 248 Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, U.S. Government Information Policy, available at 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/policy/policy.html (July 30, 1997) (“The 
right way to think about privacy, in our opinion, is that it is an externality problem.”). 
 249 Laudon, supra note 13, at 103. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
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Moreover, economic costs and benefits represent only one, albeit 
important, consideration in evaluating the social benefits of the current 
allocation of property rights in personal information.252  The legal system 
protects and advances many values and concerns, both economic and 
non-economic.253  Certain values in our society are considered so 
important that distribution of property rights contradicting those values 
would be viewed as impermissible even if it were economically efficient. 
The nineteenth century arguments about the abolition of slavery did 
not in the slightest depend upon the relationship of slavery to 
material output.  The abolitionist of that or any other era regards it 
as immaterial that the liberation of the slaves might reduce 
transaction costs or increase the gross national product. . . .  This 
position. . . rests upon the. . . belief that each person has a natural 
right to own his person as a condition of birth and as part of the 
recognition of his common humanity.  Liberty, freedom and 
personal autonomy are ideals of the law, and they cannot be 
reduced to simple efficiency considerations, however important 
efficiency may be in its own right.254 
Privacy is certainly perceived as one of such values.255  As one poll 
showed, 79% of the public believe that, if the Framers of the Declaration 
of Independence were rewriting that document today, they would add 
privacy to the trinity of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.256  
Privacy serves numerous non-economic functions, including freedom 
and liberty, essential for a democratic society.257  For that reason, the 
Constitution protects privacy rights of individuals against the federal 
and state governments.  In recent years, however, exchange of personal 
data between the public and private sectors has significantly expanded, 
 
 252 See Gellman, supra note 29 (“Arguments that focus solely on monetary costs and 
benefits miss a major part of the privacy debate.”). 
 253 Richard Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REV. 455, 
456 (1978). 
 254 Id. at 456-57. 
 255 In a recent poll, participants ranked privacy just behind the freedom of speech and 
ahead of the freedom of religion and the right to vote as the most important American 
right.  See Alan F. Westin, Intrusions.  Privacy Trade-Offs in a Free Society, PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE 
(Nov./Dec. 2000),  available  at  http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:zhMy9VKOf_QC: 
www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/pubper/pdf/pp116a.pdf+harris+poll+1990+79%25+declarati
on+independence&hl=en. 
 256 See EPIC Public Opinion on Privacy, supra note 26 (reporting results of 1990 Harris 
Poll). 
 257 See Laudon, supra note 13, at 103 (criticizing Posner for failing to recognize non-
economic value of privacy). 
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thus weakening the constitutional protection against the government.258  
For example, privacy advocates have noted the increasing flow of 
consumer data from private sector databanks to law enforcement 
agencies: 
Big Brother isn’t gone.  He’s just been outsourced.  After 
surveillance scandals in the 1960s and 1970s, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and other federal law-enforcement authorities curbed 
their file-keeping on U.S. citizens.  But in the past several years, the 
FBI, the Internal Revenue Service and other agencies have started 
buying troves of personal data from the private sector. . . .  Do 
Americans want the records of their purchases, activities, and 
interests available online for casual use by the FBI and other law 
enforcement agencies without any requirement for a court order or 
search warrant?259 
Legal ownership of personal information would guarantee individuals 
the most effective control over their privacy.  Each individual would be 
able to decide on her own how much personal information she is willing 
to share in exchange for a monetary or non-monetary gain.  For 
utilitarians, concerned with the most complete satisfaction of preferences 
of as many members of the society as possible, that solution should be 
completely acceptable. 
As for the preferences themselves, numerous polls and studies have 
consistently demonstrated that people are concerned about their inability 
to control personal information260 and that they would like to change the 
 
 258 See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 29 (expressing concern that, as “the line between the 
public and private sectors regarding personal data grows ever less clear, the protections 
against government weaken”). 
 259 Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law:  If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on You, It May 
Ask Choicepoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1 (describing how private sector companies 
specialize in collecting and compiling personal information from multiple sources, 
including credit bureaus, marketers and public records, and raising concern that this 
information is sold to dozens of government agencies). 
 260 See, e.g., EPIC Public Opinion on Privacy, supra note 26 (discussing August 2001 
Yankee Group survey of 3000 online consumers that found that 83% of respondents are 
somewhat or very concerned about privacy on Internet); see also Humphrey Taylor, Most 
People Are “Privacy Pragmatists” Who, While Concerned about Privacy, Will Sometimes Trade It 
Off for Other Benefits, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_ 
poll/index.asp?PID=365 (March 19, 2003) (reporting that 79% of participants of most recent 
Harris poll believe that it is extremely important to be in control of who can get personal 
information); Marlon Manuel, What’s for Sale?  You.  Atlantans Feel Victimized by Companies 
that Require Personal Data, Profit From It, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 24, 2002, at 1A 
(discussing poll of 2,400 adults in 15 metro Atlanta counties conducted by Marketing 
Workshop finding that 65% of participants view selling and buying personal information 
as invasion of privacy); IBM-Harris Multi-National Consumer Privacy Survey, PRIVACY & AM. 
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current law, which has proven incapable of protecting their privacy.261  In 
fact, prior to the events of September 11, many Americans singled out 
“loss of personal privacy” as the top concern for the twenty-first 
century.262  Therefore, changing the current property regime governing 
rights in personal information to give priority to the individual is 
warranted under the utilitarian theory by (i) the objective increase of 
economic and non-economic benefits to the public in general and (ii) the 
subjective satisfaction of preferences expressed by the significant 
majority of the society. 
C.  Personality Theory 
The personality theory of property originates in Hegel’s philosophy.263  
The underlying premise of the personality theory is that to achieve 
 
BUS. (Ctr. for Soc. & Legal Research), Jan. 2000, at 1 (discussing December 1999 IBM-Harris 
Multi-National Consumer Privacy Survey finding that in United States 94% of consumers 
think that personal information is vulnerable to misuse, compared to 78% in United 
Kingdom and 72% in Germany). 
 261 See EPIC Public Opinion on Privacy, supra note 26 (reporting that, based on numerous 
polls, Americans consider current self-regulatory framework insufficient to protect 
privacy).  A February 2003 Harris Poll showed that 53% of all adults disagree that “existing 
laws and organizational practices provide a reasonable level of protection for consumer 
privacy today.”  This is an increase of fifteen points from 38% in 1999.  See Taylor, supra 
note 260 (analyzing results of most recent Harris poll).  A June 2001 Gallup poll indicated 
that two-thirds of respondents favored new federal legislation to protect privacy online.  
See Majority of E-mail Users Express Concern about Internet Privacy, GALLUP POLL NEWS 
SERVICE, available at http://www.gallup.com/subscription/?m=f&c_id=10732 (June 28, 
2001).  A March 2000 BusinessWeek/Harris Poll found that 57% of respondents favored 
laws that would regulate how personal information is used.  See Business Week/Harris Poll:  
A Growing Threat, BUS. WEEK ON LINE at http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_12/b367 
3010.htm (Mar. 20, 2000).  In that same poll, only 15% supported self-regulation.  Id.; see also 
Reidenberg, supra note 16, at 884 (reporting that at public referendum on privacy citizens of 
North Dakota repealed recent state law that weakened privacy protection and restored opt-
in rule for financial information by vote of 72% to 28%). 
 262 EPIC ALERT, at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_6.15.html (Sept. 23, 1999).  
A 1999 Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll of 2,025 adults by phone found that the loss of 
personal privacy was the number one concern of Americans.  Id.  In that pre-September 11 
poll, 29% of respondents reported that the “loss of personal privacy” was a top concern.  Id.  
Privacy outranked other high-profile concerns such as overpopulation (23%), terrorist acts 
(23%), racial tensions (17%), world war (16%), and global warming (14%).  Id. 
 263 In one of the most quoted paragraphs of the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, Hegel states: 
A person has as his substantive end the right of putting his will into any and 
every thing and thereby making it his, because it has no such end in itself and 
derives its destiny and soul from his will.  This is the absolute right of 
appropriation which man has over all “things.” 
HEGEL, supra note 213, ¶ 44. 
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proper self-development  to be a person  an individual needs some 
control over resources in the external environment.264  That control is 
most commonly assured through the system of property rights   
“property is the first embodiment of freedom and so is in itself a 
substantive end.”265 
In the last couple of decades, Hegel’s theory of “property for 
personhood” has received interesting development in the work of 
Margaret Jane Radin.266  She views ownership as a relationship between 
an individual and an object and distinguishes two types of property  
“property that is bound up with a person and property that is held 
purely instrumentally  personal property and fungible property, 
respectively.”267 
Property is bound with an individual if its loss can be remedied only 
by the return of the lost object.268  Conversely, property is held only for 
instrumental reasons if it is “perfectly replaceable with other goods of 
equal market value.”269  For example, “if a wedding ring is stolen from a 
jeweler, insurance proceeds can reimburse the jeweler, but if a wedding 
ring is stolen from a loving wearer, the price of a replacement will not 
restore the status quo  perhaps no amount of money can do so.”270 
Accordingly, Radin argues that the two types of property should be 
treated differently, and personal property, the “property for 
personhood,” should receive stronger legal protection because it is 
essential to the individual’s “sense of continuity of self over time.”271  
Therefore, in a property dispute between two rival claimants, special, 
and often decisive, consideration should be given to the relationship of 
 
 264 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) 
(discussing Hegel’s philosophy). 
 265 HEGEL, supra note 213, ¶ 45. 
 266 See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 
(1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability] (exploring significance of market-
inalienability and its justifications); Radin, supra note 264 (exploring relationship between 
one’s property and personhood); Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation of Computing and 
Information Technology: Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509 (1996) [hereinafter 
Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace] (discussing scope of copyright protection in 
cyberspace); Margaret Jane Radin, Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American 
Legal Thought:  The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990) [hereinafter 
Radin, Renaissance of Pragmatism] (exploring link between pragmatism and feminism with 
Hegel). 
 267 Radin, supra note 264, at 960. 
 268 Id. at 959 (“An object is closely related to one’s personhood if its loss causes pain that 
cannot be relieved by the object’s replacement.”). 
 269 Id. at 960. 
 270 Id. at 959. 
 271 Id. at 1004. 
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each claimant to the property in question.272  For example, “if some object 
were so bound up with me that I would cease to be ‘myself’ if it were 
taken, then a government that must respect persons ought not to take 
it.”273 
Radin’s theory provides strong support for a default rule that would 
grant initial entitlement in personal information to individuals.  In fact, 
what can be more essential to an individual’s “sense of continuity of self 
over time”274 than personal information  one’s name, personal 
attributes, and the record of interests, preferences, past acts and choices?  
Conversely, the same personal information for a collector is just a 
commodity easily replaceable with money, as that routinely occurs in the 
course of a transfer from one collector to another. 
Although the personality theory supports the priority of the 
individual’s right in personal property, it may also require that the right 
remain inalienable.  Radin has consistently argued that things necessary 
for human flourishing should not be commodified.275  On the other hand, 
she recognizes that “market-inalienabilities are unjust when they are too 
harmful to personhood in our non-ideal world.”276  To mediate this kind 
of injustice, Radin has advocated incomplete commodification of things 
important to personhood.  She explains, 
In the non-ideal world we do live in, market-inalienability must be 
judged against a background of unequal power.  In that world it 
may sometimes be better to commodify incompletely than not to 
commodify at all.  Market-inalienability may be ideally justified in 
light of an appropriate conception of human flourishing, and yet 
sometimes be unjustifiable because of our non-ideal 
circumstances.277 
Whether we like it or not, in our non-ideal world, personal 
information has already been commodified.  Benefits of that 
commodification seem to be enjoyed by all market participants, save 
individuals, which is both unjust and harmful to their personhood.  In 
addition, consensual release of personal information is important to 
society as a whole.  Allowing individuals to decide for themselves 
whether, and on what terms, they would be willing to release 
 
 272 See id. 
 273 Id. at 1005. 
 274 Id. at 1004. 
 275 See generally Radin, Market Inalienability, supra note 266. 
 276 Id. at 1937. 
 277 Id. at 1903. 
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information about themselves to commercial enterprises would promote 
individuals’ sense of control over their lives, which is essential to 
“human flourishing.”  I will discuss later in this Article how individual 
rights should be balanced against the rights and interests of other 
members of the community (and, in that sense, only partially 
commodified).  However, the fact that personal information is important 
to personhood should not make it inalienable. 
One might argue that assigning individuals property rights in their 
personal information would transform “property for personhood” into 
tangible property, thus eliminating the individual’s arguable moral 
advantage over collectors.  That is not true.  The fact that a person may 
decide to sell or pawn her wedding ring does not automatically strip the 
wedding ring of its special emotional value. 
State insolvency laws routinely allow individual bankrupts to keep 
their family homes, photo albums, letters, and diaries.278  And if the 
exemption for homes may be partly explained under the theory of a 
“fresh start,” letters and pictures are clearly exempted because of their 
status as “property for personhood,” which does not mean that their 
owner may not choose at some point to part with them.  These examples 
show that the law already offers special treatment to “property for 
personhood” even though it is understood that that property is not 
inalienable in the hands of the owner.  Personal information should 
enjoy similar treatment, and “a government that must respect persons”279 
ought to give property rights of individuals priority over property rights 
of collectors. 
D.  Blackmail Argument 
In addition to the theories outlined above, the following paradox from 
the area of criminal law provides logical and moral support to the 
intuitive sense that individuals should have preferential rights in their 
personal information.  That paradox is blackmail, and over the years it 
has attracted the attention of numerous legal scholars who tried to 
explain:  why is blackmail illegal?280 
 
 278 See, e.g., Lee v. Mercantile First Nat’l Bank, 765 S.W.2d 17 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989) 
(allowing debtors to keep residential property due to homestead exemption but ordering 
sale of commercial property to satisfy debt). 
 279 Radin, supra note 264, at 1005. 
 280 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS 61 (Harvard University 
Press 1996) (noting that each generation of scholars comes to blackmail puzzle, “as to some 
muddy and treacherous test track, to try out their new theories).  The test is an apparently 
simple one:  to find out whether their approach will answer the question ‘why is blackmail 
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The essence of the paradox is that the crime of blackmail consists of 
two elements that, taken separately, are perfectly legal  a demand for 
payment (or other benefit) and a threat to expose some personal 
information.281  Why then does a combination of two non-criminal 
elements result in a crime?  Undeniably, when the concealed information 
concerns an illegal act, the society has a strong interest in forbidding 
private arrangements that jeopardize punishment and prevention of 
illegal behavior.  But why should the society criminalize, effectively, a 
sale of legal and merely embarrassing personal information? 
Take the paradigmatic case of marital infidelity.  If the blackmailer has 
a right, but not a duty, to tell the victim’s wife about the victim’s 
infidelities, why cannot she agree to forego that right in exchange for a 
payment?  This result seems abnormal because usually when a person 
has a right to do or not do something, that means she is free to agree not 
to exercise that right in exchange for some remuneration.282  Various 
theories of blackmail seek to explain that abnormality.283  They can be 
roughly grouped into:  (i) moral arguments; (ii) economic-efficiency 
arguments; and (iii) consequential arguments. 
The essence of the moral argument is that there is something deeply 
immoral (even if not illegal) either in the threat to expose the victim’s 
secret, or in the exchange of silence for money.284  Economic theories of 
 
illegal?’”); id.; see also James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
670 (1984) (offering classification of theories explaining wrongfulness of blackmail).  See 
generally LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS 140-45 (1996) (analyzing various theories of 
blackmail, including those by Epstein, Nozick, Feinberg, and Lindgren); Symposium, 
Blackmail:  Instead of a Preface, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (1993). 
 281 See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 280, at 133 (noting that in canonical blackmail scenario, 
blackmailer has right both to reveal victim’s infidelities to victim’s wife and to ask victim 
for money; “[y]et when he combines these various innocent actions, paradoxically a crime 
results  blackmail”). 
 282 Id. 
 283 For what James Boyle called “[b]y far the best survey” of the field of blackmail, see 
James Lindgren, supra note 280, at 680-701. 
 284 See, e.g., ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 
179 (1937) (distinguishing between “moral liberties” promoted by society and “immoral 
liberties” merely tolerated by it, and concluding that surrender of immoral liberty, like 
liberty to reveal damaging secret, may not be valid consideration for contract); ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 85 (Basic Books, Inc. 1974) (condemning blackmail 
as “unproductive activity” in which victim systematically gains no benefit  victims 
would be better off “if the blackmailer did not exist at all, and so wasn’t threatening them 
[and] they would be no worse off if the exchange were known to be absolutely 
impossible”); Wendy J. Gordon, The Force of Blackmail’s Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 
1758 (1993) (seeing wrongfulness of blackmail in that “[o]ne person deliberately seeks to 
harm another to serve her own ends  to exact money or other advantage  and does so 
in a context where she has no conceivable justification for her act.”); KATZ, supra note 280, 
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blackmail are concerned primarily with the inefficiency of blackmail as a 
system of private enforcement of law where the violator of a legal rule 
pays the blackmailer a sum up to the amount of what the punishment 
would be worth to that violator.285  Finally, consequential arguments put 
emphasis not on the wrongfulness or inefficiency of blackmail itself but 
rather on the negative impact it could have on the society if it were 
legal.286 
All these arguments explain why the society may find blackmail 
objectionable  there is no common benefit in immoral, economically 
inefficient, or potentially dangerous activity.  However, there is a long 
way to go between finding an activity objectionable and criminalizing it.  
The same moral, economic-efficiency, and consequential arguments can 
be used against, say, marital infidelity, but most states no longer 
criminalize adultery,287 leaving it to the sphere of private relations, like 
 
at 158-62 (seeing wrongfulness of blackmail in blackmailer’s ability to force victim to 
choose between two evils  theft (or another criminal encroachment) and revealing 
victim’s secret); Lindgren, supra note 280, at 702 (finding blackmail morally objectionable 
because blackmailer exploits leverage which belongs to someone else, namely, to third 
party from whom victim is trying to hide secret). 
 285 See, e.g., William Landis & Richard Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 42 (1975) (arguing that blackmail is inefficient both when “secret” discovered by 
blackmailer involves illegal act, as well as when there is nothing illegal about that “secret”).  
In the former scenario, 
[O]verenforcement of the law would result if the blackmailer were able to extract 
the full fine from the offenders. . . .  Alternatively, the blackmailer might sell his 
incriminating information to the offender for a price lower than the statutory cost 
of punishment to the criminal, which would reduce the effective cost of 
punishment to the criminal below the level set by legislature. 
Id.  As for the latter case, Landis and Posner argue that, if a society has not prohibited 
certain behavior that means the society decided not to expend social resources on trying to 
discover and punish it.  Id.  That social choice would be undermined if blackmailers were 
allowed to pursue and punish people engaged in a legal activity.  Id. at 43. 
 286 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 564 (1983) (arguing 
that blackmail should be outlawed because blackmailer aids victim in concealing some 
damaging information (i.e., facilitates fraud on third party or public at large)).  In addition, 
Epstein argues that blackmail creates strong incentives for a victim to satisfy the 
blackmailer’s monetary demands:  “[d]o we believe that [the victim] would never resort to 
fraud or theft given this kind of pressure, when the very nature of the transaction cuts off 
his access to the usual financial sources, such as banks or friends, who would want to know 
the purpose of the loan?”  Id.; see also Jeffrie Murphy, Blackmail:  A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 
MONIST 156, 164-66 (1980) (expressing concern that without law of blackmail there would 
be incentives for invasions of privacy). 
 287 See, e.g., Martin J. Siegel, For Better or For Worse:  Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 
J. FAM. L. 45, 49-54 (1991-92) (discussing efforts to decriminalize adultery and pointing out 
that majority of states have now decriminalized adultery, and remaining laws are rarely 
enforced). 
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any other private imperfection. 
Why then criminalize a voluntary transfer of information from a 
blackmailer to the victim, or  using the terms adopted in this paper  
from a collector to the individual?  After all, if the same 
collector/blackmailer chose to offer the information to a tabloid instead 
of the individual/victim, there would be nothing legally objectionable.  
The collector/blackmailer could use identical language in dealing with 
the individual and the tabloid:  “I have some valuable compromising 
information regarding X.  If you want, you can have it for $1000.  If not, I 
am selling it to The New York Post.”  The individual/victim is even likely 
to be happy that he has received the “right of first refusal” and thus 
avoided what he perceives as a more serious harm.  So why is it legal to 
sell personal information to a third party but not to the individual 
himself? 
The answer to all these questions lies, in my view, in the respective 
rights of the collector/blackmailer and the individual/victim to the 
discovered personal information.  They may be compared to the 
relationship of “bailors” and “bailees.”  In the situation of involuntary 
bailment288  lost and found property  a finder has rights against the 
whole world except for the true owner.289  The finder may sell or pledge 
the ring she found to a third party; if she later loses the ring, she will 
have the right to recover it from a subsequent finder.290  However, she 
may not sell the ring to the true owner because the finder’s property 
right is inferior to the right of the owner.  The same is true in the 
situation of a voluntary bailment.291  In both instances, if a bailee 
conditioned the return of property to its lawful owner on remuneration 
(other than pursuant to a prior agreement), she would be guilty of 
 
 288 Possession by a finder is often characterized as involuntary bailment.  See JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 105-06 n.2 (5th ed. 2002) (comparing rights of 
owners, voluntary and involuntary bailees, and subsequent possessors). 
 289 See, e.g., Armory v. Delamirie, K.B. 1722, 1 Strange 505 (holding that “the finder of a 
jewel, though he does not by such finding acquire an absolute property or ownership, yet 
he has such a property as will enable him to keep it against all but the rightful owner”); see 
also RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 26 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 
1975) (explaining that “the title of a finder is good as against the whole world but the true 
owner”). 
 290 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 288, at 104. 
 291 Voluntary bailment may, in addition, impose on the bailee higher obligations of care 
with respect to the entrusted property, although the modern trend is to apply uniform 
standard of “reasonable care under the circumstances” across the board.  See Richard H. 
Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liabilities of Bailees:  The Elusive Uniform Standard of 
Reasonable Care, 41 KAN. L. REV. 97, 99 (1992). 
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theft.292 
A similar principle applies to the rights of a collector and the 
individual whose personal information has been either discovered by a 
collector (analogously to involuntary bailment) or entrusted by the 
individual (analogously to voluntary bailment).  The possession of this 
information may give a collector some property rights but they are 
subordinate to the rights of the individual.  A different default rule, one 
that assigns priority either to a collector or to the public at large, would 
lead to an unappealing implication that the blackmailer who collected 
personal information about her victim should be allowed to make the 
victim pay for it.293  The blackmail analogy, together with principal 
theories of property, demonstrates that, although a collector may have 
rights in individuals’ personal information, these rights should be 
subordinate to the rights of the individuals. 
VI.  BALANCING INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY, AND COLLECTORS 
The fact that individuals should have a prior property right in their 
personal information does not mean that this right should be absolute or 
exclusive.  Personal information, like information in general, differs from 
traditional forms of property.  It can be possessed by more than one 
person,294 it is not destroyed in the act of consumption, it does not lose 
value when used and, conversely, may lose value when it is not used 
and becomes obsolete.295 
Personal information has certain similarities with intellectual property, 
in particular copyright.296  One can look at people as the authors of their 
 
 292 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.5 (defining theft of property lost, mislaid, or 
delivered by mistake). 
 293 This conclusion made Posner, for instance, insert a footnote questioning his own 
argument that personal information about an individual should be public: 
If I am correct that the facts about a person should be in the public domain so 
that those who have to decide whether to initiate (or continue) social or business 
relations with the person will be able to do so on full information, does it not 
follow that the Nosey Parker should be allowed to sell back the information he 
obtains to the individual? 
Posner, supra note 222, at 421 n.57. 
 294 See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International 
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 413 (1983) (“It is the nature of. . . 
any. . . tangible property that possession by one person precludes possession by anyone 
else. . . .   Many people, however, can use the same piece of information.”). 
 295 See Mell, supra note 16, at 69 (noting that in certain respects personal information 
“does not conform to the existing definitions of either personal or intangible property”). 
 296 Copyright protection serves to assure an author’s priority and limited monopoly in a 
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own lives, generating information as they develop their personalities.297  
In fact, in Europe, personal information is viewed similarly to intellectual 
property.298  In the United States, however, copyright protects only the 
expressive content of the work, not the ideas or facts contained therein.299  
Consequently, personal information is outside the subject matter of 
American copyright law.  There have been suggestions made to broaden 
the scope of copyright protection to include personal information.300  This 
solution would certainly enhance protection of individual privacy.  On 
the other hand, it raises slippery-slope concerns:  it could open the door 
to treating information in general as a copyrightable material and could 
lead to creating a monopoly on information.301 
Instead of trying to stretch one or another traditional category to cover 
personal information, it may be worth recognizing it as a new bundle of 
rights, which combines elements of traditional property and intellectual 
property, as well as property and privacy.  Due to its special nature, 
more than one person in the society may have a legitimate interest in 
personal information.  Accordingly, that limits the scope of property 
rights that ought to be granted to individuals. 
 
particular form of expression and is automatically granted to all “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly 
or with the aid of a machine or device.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 297 Solove, supra note 99, at 1112. 
 298 Angela R. Broughton et al., International Employment, 33 INT’L LAW. 291, 292 (1999) 
(pointing out that, culturally, Europeans see personal data as akin to intellectual property).  
Broughton explains: 
Europeans believe corporations should not traffic in information without the 
consent of its owner.  To explain Europeans’ distrust of free transfers in personal 
information, some have cited the Nazi government’s abuses of personal data to 
further its aims. Others note that Europeans are bewildered by the U.S. fixation 
on politicians’ sex lives.  Europeans, unlike Americans, consider personal 
information  be  it about politicians, employees, or anyone else  private. 
Id. 
 299 See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that 
“Salinger has a right to protect the expressive content of his unpublished writings for the 
term of his copyright,” but did not have protection for ideas or facts that were included 
within). 
 300 See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1151-
59 (2000) (advocating licensing regime and privacy protection rules analogous to trade 
secrets law). 
 301 See Volokh, supra note 81, at 1051 (“Before wholeheartedly endorsing the principle 
that calling certain information ‘intellectual property’ lets the government restrict speech 
communicating that information, we should think about the consequences of such an 
endorsement.”). 
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In her influential article about a computer “persona,”302 Patricia Mell 
likens personal information to real property in medieval England and 
argues that individuals should own it in “fee simple.”303  In Mell’s view, 
the rights of all other interest groups (commercial enterprises, the public, 
and the government) should be subordinate to those of the individual.304 
While agreeing in general with Mell’s property-based approach, I see 
the individual’s rights with respect to personal information as 
significantly less absolute.  The society has an interest in the free flow of 
information, and this interest needs to be taken into account.  To give 
individuals an unabridged right in their data would threaten to 
immobilize it.  Moreover, as has been discussed earlier, personal 
information is not only property, it is also speech, which gives rise to an 
inherent conflict between the value of privacy to the individual and the 
value of free speech to the society.305  Finally, the original collector has a 
legitimate interest in the personal information it collects in order to run 
its business and better serve its customers. 
To satisfy all those interests, I suggest that the property right of the 
individual be limited in three respects.  The first limitation should be its 
duration.  Normally, property rights do not expire.  If I own a piece of 
property, my devisees or heirs would inherit it, absent any explicit 
condition or limitation attached to that particular property.  One well 
known exception to this rule is intellectual property.306  The limited rights 
of the owner are the result of a trade-off between the needs of authors in 
protecting their work and the needs of the society in the free flow of 
ideas. 
Conversely, personal rights, including the right to privacy, do 
expire.307  The common law rule is that “the right of privacy dies with the 
 
 302 By “persona” Mell means “the various ways by which a person can be identified by 
personal information about him.”  Mell, supra note 16, at 3. 
 303 Id. at 76 (arguing that “[t]he persona should be viewed as property, the ultimate 
‘ownership’ or ‘fee simple’ of which resides in the individual.”). 
 304 Id. (“The rights of any other entity (i.e., any group, class, association or government) 
that might obtain, access, make use of, or disclose the persona would be subordinate to 
those of the individual.”). 
 305 See discussion supra Part III. 
 306 Copyright protection is limited in duration to the life of the author plus 70 years for 
individuals and the period of 95 years from the first publication or 120 years from creation, 
whichever expires first, for works made for hire or by employees.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a)-(c) 
(2000); see also Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1984).  
Patent rights generally expire after 20 years.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
 307 See MCCARTHY, supra note 60, at 9-2; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 159§ 117, 
at 851. 
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individual.”308  The only exception to this rule, recognized in 
approximately one-third of all states,309 involves the right of publicity.310  
The majority rule that disallows the postmortem right to privacy (other 
than the right of publicity) is based on the idea that this right protects 
dignitary and reputational interests, which are inherently personal.311  
Once the subject is dead, the reason for protecting those rights 
disappears.312  The right of publicity, on the other hand, is a property 
right; it protects against infringement of the commercial value 
attributable to a human identity.313  Those states that extend the right of 
publicity beyond the lifetime of the individual usually limit its 
postmortem duration from as few as ten to as many as one hundred 
years.314 
Arguments in favor of protecting personal information fit under the 
logic of both traditional privacy (based on the notion that individuals 
should be able to keep their actions, choices, and preferences secret) and 
the right of publicity (based on the sense that individuals should receive 
some economic benefit from the sale of their personal information).  In 
most instances, however, personal information has value for the 
individual, collectors, and the public only during the lifetime of the 
individual. 
Generally speaking, individuals have few reasons to worry about 
postmortem commercial use (not involving publication) of their personal 
information, whether it be for marketing purposes, financial risk 
assessment, or socio-political profiling.  By the same token, commercial 
enterprises should have very little interest in deceased customers.  As for 
publication, current law already protects individuals by disallowing 
non-media entities from using the identities of deceased persons.315 
 
 308 Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A.2d 694, 701 (N.J. App. Ct. 1986). 
 309 See MCCARTHY, supra note 60, at 9-44, 9-45 (listing thirteenstates that have 
established right of publicity, or at least most aspects of it, by statute, and noting that in 
another four jurisdictions courts have found that their respective common law recognizes 
postmortem right of publicity). 
 310 See id. at 9-3. 
 311 Id. 
 312 See id. at 9-3, 9-4. 
 313 See id. at 9-9 (listing arguments for and against postmortem right of publicity). 
 314 Id. at 9-54.1, 9-58 (noting that Oklahoma and Indiana statutes have longest 
postmortem periods for right of publicity and that under Washington law, postmortem 
duration of life of publicity where person’s identity has no commercial value is tenyears). 
 315 See Nature’s Way Prod., Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245, 252-53 (D. 
Utah 1990) (rejecting so-called “historical information exception” enjoyed by media when 
claimed by seller of herbal medicines in order to use name of deceased well known author 
and lecturer on herbal medicine). 
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Finally, the society has to balance the burdens and benefits of the free 
flow of information, on the one hand, and privacy, on the other.  When 
the individual whose privacy is at issue is dead, the protection of his 
privacy loses its all important status compared to the need for full and 
correct historical data.  For all these reasons, the interest of an individual 
in his personal information should not be a fee simple but rather a life 
estate, which at the end of the individual’s lifetime springs to the public 
domain. 
The second limitation on individual property rights is necessary to 
recognize the legitimate interest of the original collector.  In the context 
of a voluntary transaction with the individual, the original collector 
should be granted a non-exclusive and unalienable automatic license in 
the collected personal information.  The collector should be allowed to 
collect and use this information for its own research and marketing 
purposes.  Before transferring personal information to a third party, 
however, the collector would have to obtain the affirmative consent of 
the individual. 
Concerns have been raised316 that a law limiting rights of enterprises in 
respect of customer data already collected by them may amount to a 
“taking” of private property for public good under the Fifth 
Amendment.317  The Supreme Court has recognized that a privacy 
regulation that substantially interferes with a collector’s use of data that 
he has collected or processed may constitute a “regulatory taking” and 
require compensation.318 
A regulatory taking occurs when the government’s regulation “denies 
an owner economically viable use”319 of his property.  If Congress 
enacted legislation that completely shifted property rights over personal 
information from collectors to individuals, that legislation might very 
well constitute a taking.  However, legislation that would permit 
enterprises to collect, store, and use personal data for any legitimate 
 
 316 See Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and the 
United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 207 (1999) (expressing concern that, “[i]f the government 
prohibits the processing of personal data, it could deny the owner all or most of the 
‘economically viable use’ of that data.”). 
 317 The Fifth Amendment states: “No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 318 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that 
Environmental Protection Agency’s use of plaintiff’s proprietary research data constituted 
compensable taking). 
 319 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); see also Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 (1979). 
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business purposes, other than its unauthorized transfer, would not deny 
collectors all or most of the “economically viable use” of that 
information. 
In addition, the Supreme Court does not find a taking when a 
regulation merely abates “nuisance-like” conduct,320 because one never 
has a property right to harm others.321  Therefore, legislation that, on the 
one hand, preserves the economic interests of collectors, and on the 
other, protects individuals against unauthorized dissemination of their 
personal information, should not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
Finally, the third limitation on individual rights in personal 
information should come in the form of non-exclusive automatic licenses 
in favor of the society at large.322  That limitation would allow the 
government to collect and transfer certain personal information (e.g., for 
purposes of tax collection, maintaining public records, or law 
enforcement),323 subject, of course, to constitutional constraints.  It would 
also allow private, as well as public non-commercial, exchange of 
personal information by citizens.  Lastly, it would permit public media to 
collect and publish any “newsworthy” personal information without 
individual consent.324  In addition, the license in favor of public media 
would authorize transfer of personal information from a third party, 
 
 320 Under the current test, the government must show that the power to promulgate the 
regulation stems from the “background principles of the State’s law of property and 
nuisance.”  See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
 321 See Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause in America’s Industrial States After Lucas, 24 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 281, 288 (1993) (pointing out that nuisance exception to Takings Clause is 
consistent with language and intent of Takings Clause because, under nuisance law theory, 
one does not have property right to harm others). 
 322 The rights and limitations pursuant to this license are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 323 Cf.  The Banks and Banking Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 332.15(a)(7) (2003) (disposing of 
requirement of customer consent for disclosure of nonpublic personal information: 
(i) To comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules and other applicable legal 
requirements;  
(ii) To comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory 
investigation, or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities; or  
(iii) To respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having 
jurisdiction over you for examination, compliance, or other purposes as 
authorized by law.). 
 324 See Finger v. Omni Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 145 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990) 
(holding that there was relationship between photograph of large family and fertility article 
and that use of photograph without plaintiff’s consent did not violate prohibitions of New 
York Rights of Privacy); see also NIMMER, supra note 98, ¶ 16.08, at 16-25 (stating that there 
exists right of independent discovery, and information “obtained from unprotected or 
published sources can be freely used independent of  underlying property interest”). 
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other than a commercial collector, to the media (e.g., an interview 
concerning a public figure) and would protect the media if the 
information supplied by a third-party collector was obtained by 
unlawful means.325 
Current privacy law effectively recognizes all these “carve-outs.”  For 
instance, under both constitutional and tort law, media are immune from 
liability326 for unauthorized use of personal identity as long as the 
identity bears a reasonable relation to the news.327  The term “news” has 
been interpreted broadly to include all media presentations of 
information on public issues. 328  Thus, current law affords adequate 
protection for information that should be disseminated on the basis of its 
newsworthiness. 
In a nutshell, the suggested legal regime would give individuals 
property rights in their personal information.  They would own this 
information during their lifetime, subject to a (i) non-exclusive automatic 
inalienable license to the original collector and (ii) limited non-exclusive 
automatic license to the general public.  This way, friends of, say, Robert 
Bork would be free to talk, and newspapers free to write, about movies 
he watches or books he reads, but a video- or bookstore would not be 
free to reveal his customer records even in the heat of his nomination 
campaign. 
 
 
 
 
 325 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (reasoning that right to privacy fails 
when weighed against media’s right to publish matters of public interest despite private 
nature, and illegal acquisition, of information). 
 326 Eastwood v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
(“Publication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to 
know, and the freedom of the press to tell it, cannot ordinarily be actionable.”). 
 327 See, e.g., Barrows v. Rozansky, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481, 485 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that “to be 
privileged such use must be legitimately related to the informational value of the 
publication and may not be a mere disguised commercialization of a person’s 
personality”). 
 328 Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (N.Y. 1968).  The court in 
Paulsen explained: 
The scope of the subject matter which may be considered of “public interest” or 
“newsworthy” has been defined in most liberal and far reaching terms.  The 
privilege of enlightening the public is by no means limited to the dissemination 
of news in the sense of current events but extends far beyond to include all types 
of factual, educational and historical data, or even entertainment and 
amusement, concerning interesting phases of human activity in general. 
Id. 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art33
BERGELSON_MACRO_-_NOVEMBER_21 11/22/2003  10:53 AM 
2003] It’s Personal But Is It Mine? 443 
VII.  PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION:  SOME PRACTICAL 
ISSUES 
The proposed law should be codified in federal legislation with certain 
fact-specific issues left to judicial interpretation.  The federal nature of 
the legislation would ensure consistency of citizens’ rights all over the 
country and bring American law into accord with evolving international 
privacy standards.  Under that legislation, throughout their lifetimes, 
individuals would have an option to keep their personal information 
private, or conversely, sell, pledge, or license it.329  Since the interest 
owned is only a life estate, property rights in personal information 
would not be devisable and would not pass by intestate succession. 
Naturally, any personal information published by individuals 
themselves would enter the public domain.330  One could argue that by 
simply making our information visible we “publish” it and thus give up 
our property right to it.  This argument is flawed.  It focuses on the 
outdated privacy rationale of secrecy instead of the more relevant 
rationale of control.331  The difference between an affirmative decision to 
publish certain information about oneself and information inadvertently 
revealed through, say, browsing the Internet may be analogized to the 
difference between abandoned and lost or stolen property.  In the first 
case, the owner relinquishes her property rights while in the second case 
she does not.  I do not give up my property right in my ring just because 
I make it visible to others.  I do not give up my property right even if I 
“misplace” my ring by leaving it on a bathroom sink, “lose” it by 
dropping it on the floor, or fail to guard it well enough from a thief.  In 
 
 329 At least one attempt by an individual to sell personal information has been 
recorded.  See Diane Anderson, Woman Auctions Personal Info Online (June 15, 2000), 
available at http://www.pcworld.com/resource/printable/article/0,aid,17199,00.asp.  In 
June 2000, Tracy Coyle tried to auction off information about herself.  Id.  She answered 378 
questions commonly asked by marketers regarding her financial status, health, and 
religious beliefs, but no one made a bid.  Id.  A year later Coyle started a website company, 
www.Itsmyprofile.com, which aspires to make it possible for consumers to sell their 
personal data directly to advertisers.  See Julia Scheers, My Shoe Size?  It’ll Cost You (June 11, 
2001), available at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,44278,00.html.  “Your 
information is just that  yours,” says Coyle.  Id.  “If someone else benefits from that 
information, you deserve compensation for its use.”  Id.  Coyle’s current goal is to attract 
20,000 members to make her member profiles marketable.  Id.  She plans to charge 
advertisers 14 cents to access each member’s 1,300-question profiles and 25 cents to send 
members e-mails, which are routed through her site to avoid their resale.  Id. 
 330 See NIMMER, supra note 98, ¶ 16.08, at 16-24 (analogizing privacy law to trade secrecy 
and suggesting that intimate details of life disclosed in autobiography are not private and 
any property interest in respect thereto is waived). 
 331 See discussion supra notes 101-04, 186-87 and accompanying text. 
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other words, I do not lose a property right unless I make an affirmative 
decision to relinquish control over it.  By the same token, I do not publish 
personal information just because I make bits and pieces of it visible to 
others, or because someone manages to collect or steal it. 
Recognizing the special nature of personal information, the law should 
protect it from involuntary transfers such as a judgment lien, although a 
voluntary pledge should be enforceable.332  The pledgee should be able to 
perfect their security interest in personal information, just like in any 
other intangible, by filing a financing statement in the domicile of the 
pledgor  the same way security interests in customer lists are perfected 
now.333  In bankruptcy, the law should provide for an exclusion of 
personal information from the estate of the individual, analogously to 
how state insolvency laws currently exclude certain personal 
possessions.334 
The law should vest in the individual certain inalienable rights such as 
the right to obtain one’s records, to demand correction of errors, and to 
block or erase any incomplete or inaccurate information335 even after all 
other rights to it have been transferred.  Similar approaches may be seen, 
for instance, in European legislation336 protecting “moral rights”337 of 
 
 332 For a similar treatment of certain property, see Uniform Exemptions Act, UNIF. 
EXEMPTIONS ACT § 8(a)(3), 13 U.L.A. 298 (2002) (exempting from application of judicial lien, 
among other things, family portraits and heirlooms of particular sentimental value to the 
individual). 
 333 See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1998) (listing requirements for perfection of security interest in 
intangibles). 
 334 For a similar treatment of certain property in bankruptcy, see BANKR. CODE, 11 
U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000) (providing individual debtor with choice between exemptions 
authorized by Bankruptcy Code, other federal law, and state law); BANKR. CODE, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(d)(3) & (4) (authorizing exemptions of various property that is held “primarily for the 
personal, family or household use of the debtor”).  For an example of state debtor-creditor 
law exemptions, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205(a) (McKinney 2003) (exempting from application 
of judicial lien, among other things, family bible, family pictures, seat or pew in place of 
worship, various household items, wedding ring, watch, etc., all subject to value 
limitations). 
 335 The European Union Data Protection Directive includes a similar principle.  See Data 
Protection Directive, supra note 2, art. 12 (investing data subject with right to obtain 
records, correct errors, and block or erase any incomplete or inaccurate information). 
 336 See Samuelson, supra note 300, at 1147 (noting that many countries protect moral 
rights, but two most commonly discussed are France and Germany, and providing 
examples of protection of moral rights in these two countries); see also Law on the Intellectual 
Property Code, No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., 
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS, LAWS AND TREATIES (1996) [hereinafter French Act]; 
Urheberrechtgesetz  (UrhG)  § IV.2,  arts. 12-14,  available  at  http://iecl.iuscomp.org/gla 
/statutes/UrhG.htm [hereinafter German Act]. 
 337 Samuelson, supra note 300, at 1147 (listing such commonly recognized moral rights 
as right of attribution (i.e., right to be identified as author of work); right of integrity (i.e., 
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authors even after copyright has been sold.  The moral rights regime is 
based on the idea that artistic and literary creations are more than just a 
commodity; rather, they are “emanations of the author’s personality in 
which he can and should retain an interest even after copies of the work 
have entered the stream of commerce.”338  Some countries consider moral 
rights sufficiently important and vulnerable to make them inalienable.339 
The inalienability regime is justified in this case by the dual nature of 
privacy (it is both a personal right and a social value) and by the 
legitimate interest of society in the accuracy of publicized information.  
Under the Calabresi-Melamed rules,340 inalienability is warranted when 
people seek to avoid non-monetary externalities and impose on 
themselves a restriction, so that “they will be prevented from yielding to 
momentary temptations which they deem harmful to themselves.”341  If a 
significant number of people chose, for instance, to waive the rights 
described above in exchange for coupons, the society as a whole would 
be hurt.  Making rights inalienable is particularly justified in 
circumstances involving information asymmetry and collective action 
problems (which is currently the case in the area of information 
privacy),342 because those systemic problems increase the risk of 
irrational decisionmaking by individuals.343 
 
right to protect work from alterations that would be harmful to author’s reputation); right 
of “divulgation” (i.e., right to decide when and under what circumstances to divulge 
work); and, recognized in some jurisdictions, right of withdrawal (i.e., right to withdraw all 
published copies of work if work no longer represents author’s views or otherwise would 
be detrimental to author’s reputation)).  For examples of French law, see French Act, supra 
note 336, art. L. 121-1 (codifying rights of attribution and integrity), art. L. 121-2 (codifying 
right of divulgation), and art. L. 121-4 (codifying right of withdrawal).  For examples of 
German law, see German Act, supra note 336, art. 13 (codifying right of attribution), art. 14 
(codifying right of integrity), and art. 12 (codifying right of divulgation). 
 338 Samuelson, supra note 300, at 1146. 
 339 See id. (discussing France as example of jurisdiction that made moral rights 
inalienable to protect them against unfair contractual overrides).  For a general discussion 
of the actual inalienability of moral rights in Europe see Neil Netanel, Alienability 
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental 
Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 7, 48 n.254-305 (1994) (arguing that essential 
moral rights are properly considered to be inalienable under Continental law). 
 340 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 195, at 1111-13; see also Radin, Market-Inalienability, 
supra note 266, at 1903-36 (arguing that, in name of human flourishing, certain personal 
interests should remain inalienable). 
 341 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 195, at 1113.  One example of such restriction 
would be a law prohibiting selling oneself into slavery.  Id. at 1112. 
 342 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 106, at 822 (pointing out that there are significant 
information asymmetries and collective action problems regarding privacy on Internet). 
 343 To address the same concern, the law should also impose implied warranties (e.g., 
accuracy and transferability) on any transferor of personal information with the individual 
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Other rights in personal information should be freely transferable 
upon individual consent.  That consent may take different forms.  It 
could be an outright sale, in which case both the original and the 
secondary collector would be free to transfer the personal information to 
whomever they want.  Alternatively, the consent may be in the form of a 
transferee-, industry-, or purpose-specific license, either free of any 
restrictions or subject to certain limitations on future transfers.  That 
license, for instance, could completely block dissemination of some of the 
provided information and allow sharing of other information only with 
entities of a particular type (e.g., located in the United States or having a 
similar privacy protection policy).  Presumably, the price would reflect 
the difference in the scope of the transferred rights.  That way, 
individuals could control the type of information a business may transfer 
into the secondary market.  For instance, if the licensee failed to follow 
the terms of the transaction, the individual could revoke the license or 
petition a court for an injunction.344 
Others have suggested that individual consent should be required not 
only for transfers of personal information but also for its collection and 
internal use by a company.345  In my view, such a requirement is 
excessively harsh on businesses and also unnecessary.  As long as 
collected information is used for product development, research, and 
general marketing strategies, individual privacy does not suffer.  Any 
communications with customers or potential customers certainly must 
be consensual  but that is true even in the absence of any direct 
 
being a third party beneficiary of those warranties.  See Mell, supra note 16, at 79 
(suggesting that “[t]he privilege of the holder to use and disclose the persona [should] 
carry a double warranty:  a warranty of authority to disclose and a warranty of accuracy.”).  
That would protect interests of both the individual and society, especially if the current 
trend of accumulation of personal information by commercial enterprises continues and 
certain enterprises start specializing in assembling and selling individual personal profiles. 
 344 See Basho, supra note 32, at 1525 (promoting license agreements as means to regulate 
use and transfer of personal information).  A proposed licensing agreement might provide: 
I grant Company X the right to distribute my name only to third parties with 
privacy policies equal to Company X’s until 1/1/02 and I will receive $2.00 each 
time my name is transferred to such a third party.  After 1/1/02, Company X 
must cease all use of this information and will no longer have any rights or 
interest in it. 
Id. 
 345 Id.  A licensing agreement proposed by Basho includes the following language: 
“Company X is authorized to collect my name, address, income, and online buying habits.  
It may use this information to determine what products I will be most interested in buying, 
to make decisions about its own product development, and to send me emails about 
changes to this product.”  Id. 
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relationship between a business and an individual.  Telemarketers’ calls 
in the middle of a dinner are no less annoying because the caller 
obtained your phone number from local “white pages,” rather than 
directly from you. 
Irrespective of the chosen form of a transaction, the consent of the 
individual should be affirmative (based on the “opt-in” model) and 
informed, in writing and conspicuous on its face.  In addition, the law 
should prohibit a collector to condition doing business with an 
individual on obtaining such consent.346  This last requirement poses 
some interesting questions. 
The first general question is how to justify this restriction?  Normally, 
if an individual is free to sell, pledge, or otherwise transfer her property, 
a counterparty is equally free to demand a transfer of that property in 
consideration for entering into a transaction.  Why forbid a collector (e.g., 
Yahoo!) from requiring that individuals provide their personal 
information as consideration for gaining access to Yahoo! databases?  
The reasons for that restriction are in the inequality of bargaining 
positions of an individual and a service provider like Yahoo!, and in the 
risk of injury to individuals’ privacy inherent in that inequality. 
Similar considerations stand behind the doctrines of 
“unconscionability” and “adhesion,” which permit courts to refuse 
enforcement of coerced agreements.  The doctrine of unconscionability 
has been applied most frequently in areas where there is an inequality of 
bargaining power “to protect those who cannot protect themselves.”347  
An agreement may be held unconscionable if it takes away some 
important rights of a consumer, including a waiver of defense clause,348 a 
disclaimer of some or all warranties,349 or consent to repossession of an 
item sold on credit if a seller “deems itself insecure.”350  A forced consent 
 
 346 Today, many websites do not allow access to Internet users unless they provide their 
personal information.  See, e.g., Schober et al., supra note 45, at 721 (referring to New York 
Times website, which effectively provides that “if you will not sign in and disgorge 
personal information, then you can’t read the paper online.”). 
 347 Hertz Corp. v. Attorney Gen. of New York, 518 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707-08 (N.Y. 1987); see 
also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”). 
 348 See Chem. Bank v. Rinden Prof’l Ass’n, 498 A.2d 706, 714 (N.H. 1985) (holding that 
“neither the waiver itself, nor the manner in which it was executed, was unconscionable”). 
 349 See Rottinghaus v. Howell, 666 P.2d 899, 903-05 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding 
disclaimer of warranties unconscionable where disclaimer provisions were overbroad, not 
bargained for, and not specifically agreed upon). 
 350 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 163 (5th ed. 
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to the transfer of personal information takes away an equally important 
right of consumers  their right to privacy  and should be seen as 
equally unconscionable. 
An adhesion contract is typically a standardized form “offered to 
consumers of goods and services on essentially a ‘take it or leave it’ basis 
without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain and 
under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired 
product or services except by acquiescing in the form contract.”351  The 
distinctive feature of a contract of adhesion is that “the weaker party has 
no realistic choice as to its terms.”352  A requirement that, in order to 
receive goods or services, a consumer must sign a standard, non-
negotiable consent form permitting the collector to transfer the 
consumer’s personal information squarely fits under the definition of an 
adhesion contract. 
The same public policy that makes courts interfere with adhesion 
contracts (to avoid systematic unfair advantage by a more sophisticated 
party with overwhelmingly stronger bargaining opportunities) should 
be followed to protect individuals from collectors who may require their 
customers to consent to the transfer of their personal information as a 
condition of doing business.  A consent obtained by such an ultimatum 
should be considered unconscionable and a contract of adhesion.  That 
agreement should be null and void ab initio; any further transfer 
pursuant to that agreement should be deemed unauthorized and thus 
actionable against the collector and anyone who has obtained consumer 
information from it. 
What if the original collector does not explicitly refuse to transact with 
an individual but instead offers different prices for its goods or services?  
For example, you can have this book for $5 if you consent to any further 
transfer of your personal information but, without such consent, it will 
cost you $15.  At which point does this price differential become punitive 
and in fact block the transaction?  Perhaps, this issue should be left for 
courts to decide  they are experienced in reviewing similar disputes 
when deciding, for instance, whether liquidated damages provided for 
 
2000) (listing examples of substantive unconscionability). 
 351 Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); see also 
Burkons v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Cal., 798 P.2d 1308, 1320 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d on 
other grounds, 813 P.2d 710 (Ariz. 1991) (explaining that essence of adhesion contract is that 
it is offered to consumers on essentially “take it or leave it” basis). 
 352 Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 356; see also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion  
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943) (concluding that 
essence of adhesion contract is that bargaining position and leverage enable one party to 
select and control risks assumed under contract). 
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in an agreement are reasonable353 or whether a foreclosure sale was at 
fair market value.354  The determination of substantive unconscionability 
pursuant to section 2-302 of the U.C.C.355 often turns on the question of 
whether a contractual price was excessive.356  A court may find a price 
excessive because “it returns too great a profit to the seller, or because it 
yields too great a return on the seller’s invested capital, or because it is a 
substantially higher price than other merchants similarly or unsimilarly 
situated charge for like items.”357  Analogous criteria may be applied by a 
court to determine whether the price attached to the individual’s 
personal information is commercially reasonable or excessive and, 
therefore, punitive and impermissible. 
The original collector in the proposed legal structure would be able to 
freely use any personal information collected by it in the course of selling 
goods or services to its customers, but only internally.  In the modern 
corporate world full of corporate giants, mergers and acquisitions, the 
meaning of “internal use” would need to be defined.  I would suggest 
that affiliates and subsidiaries be allowed to enjoy the same kind of 
automatic license as the original collector itself, but only affiliates and 
 
 353 See, e.g., John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1574-75 (D. Kan. 
1986) (concluding that liquidated damages clause on purchase option price before option 
matured was punitive and not enforceable); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Hesco Constr., 
Inc. 614 P.2d 1302, 1306-07 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (opining that fair damages formula was 
not penalty). 
 354 See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (deciding whether foreclosure 
sale was conducted legally and fairly); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Maplewood Invs., 31 F.3d 
1276, 1278-79 (4th Cir. 1994) (reversing trial court’s decision to bar creditor-purchaser from 
obtaining deficiency judgment because property sale was improper due to conflict of 
interest on part of trustee and officers); OMP v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Fin., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 251, 
254 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (holding foreclosure sale was conducted in equitable manner because 
there was no improper conduct even though lender bid amount was substantially below 
amount of indebtedness). 
 355 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998), which states: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to 
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
 356 See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 350, at 158 (noting that one of two groups of 
cases where courts most often find clauses to be unconscionable is excessive-price cases). 
 357 Id. at 161; see also Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 888 (N.H. 
1964) (finding price excessive because mark-up was too high); State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. 
ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321-22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (finding price excessive because it 
was significantly higher than price charged by other merchants for same or similar goods). 
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wholly-owned subsidiaries in the same line of business.358  For other 
affiliates and subsidiaries, consent of the individual should be required, 
just as for any other transfer of personal information from an original 
collector to the secondary market. 359 
VIII.  ENFORCEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL’S PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 
Finally, a few words regarding the enforcement of these rights.  The 
proposed statute should provide for a private cause of action, legal fees 
(which may be denied in case of a frivolous lawsuit), injunctive relief, 
and damages.  The damages should be the higher of actual damages and 
a certain statutory amount.  This amount may be a fixed sum or may be 
calculated for each day of violation, analogously to the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, which provides for the higher of $10,000 
or $100 per each day of violation.360  In the case of an unauthorized 
transfer of personal information, a fixed amount would be more 
appropriate, whereas in a situation where the defendant refuses to 
correct inaccurate personal information, a per diem amount would 
probably make more sense.  In addition, criminal penalties, similar to 
those provided by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, should be available to 
penalize any officer or employee of a company who knowingly and 
 
 358 See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: Notice, Autonomy and 
Enforcement of Data Privacy Legislation, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1263, 1311 (2002) (advocating 
limiting inter-affiliate sharing of information to affiliates in same line of business). 
 359 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, for example, has been widely criticized for allowing 
inter-affiliate sharing of personal information.  See, e.g., Ralph Nader, Banking Jackpot, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at A33 (“The affiliates of the conglomerates and their 
telemarketers will be free to share many intimate details of an individual’s buying habits, 
investing patterns, health records, entertainment choices, employment data and other 
aspects of one’s existence.”); see also Cuaresma, supra note 66, at 512.  Cuaresma explains: 
Even though Congress explicitly directs each financial institution to “respect the 
privacy of its customers,” customers cannot opt-out of information sharing 
between affiliates.  Allowing a single company to engage in banking, securities, 
and insurance activities increases the secondary uses of such information.  For 
example, once a banking division obtains nonpublic personal information, there 
is no legal roadblock to prevent it from sharing that information with its 
insurance and securities divisions. 
Id.  at 512. 
 360 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 252(c)(2), 100 Stat. 
1848 (1986) (providing for recovery of greater of (A) sum of actual damages suffered by 
plaintiff and any profits made by violator as result of violation, or (B) greater of $100 day 
for each day of violation and $ 10,000); see also Mell, supra note 16, at 79 (advocating similar 
penalties for unauthorized dissemination of personal information). 
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willfully supplies information concerning an individual from the 
company’s files to a person not authorized to receive that information.361 
Legislation based on such principles would adequately protect the 
respective interests of American businesses and consumers and would 
bring U.S. law into accord with the developing body of international law 
regarding treatment of personal information. 
CONCLUSION 
As I was finishing this Article, my eleven-year-old daughter received a 
junk-mail letter with some Internet-related advertisements in it.  The 
letter was addressed to a Sue Grong (a fictitious name my daughter has 
used a few times on various websites), but our home address was 
absolutely correct.  “Why did you give them our real address?” I asked.  
“But I did not,” she replied, “I gave them a non-existing address in New 
York City.”  “So how did they get our address?”  I started to say, and 
then I stopped. . . . 
By the way, Peter Steiner’s cartoon had a sequel.362 
 
 
 
 361 See United States Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508 (1970), as amended 
by Pub. L. 104-208 § 620, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (providing for maximum two-year 
imprisonment for “[a]ny officer or employee of consumer reporting agency who knowingly 
and willfully supplies information concerning an individual from the agency’s files to a 
person not authorized to receive that information”); see also Mell, supra note 16, at 79 
(suggesting similar penalty for unauthorized willful disclosures). 
 362 Anonymizer,  at  http://web.archive.org/web/19970403034059/www.anonymizer. 
com/cartoon.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2003) (the website’s motto is:  “Because on today’s 
Internet, people do know you’re a dog”). 
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